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1 Introduction
The topic of legal precedent and the justice system’s effects on the labor market is understudied
in labor economics. For labor economists who study discrimination it is worth noting that much of
public policy surrounding labor market discrimination is carried out through the court system, in
contrast with other areas of public policy, like education policy, welfare policy, tax policy, health
care policy, etc. By studying the Courts of Appeals, we study some of the most important cases
that establish precedent, after which the vast majority of potential cases must follow suit or settle.
We study sexual harassment law, which is primarily court-made, built on top of anti-discrimination
statutes that generally predate the concept of sexual harassment.1 While sexual harassment has
received the attention of one economic model (Basu 2003), it receives no mention in two summaries
of the empirical literature on discrimination (Bertrand and Duflo 2016; Neumark 2016) despite the
presence of sexual harassment law in U.S. courts since the 1980s, the persistence of labor market
gender inequality (Blau and Kahn 2006), survey evidence indicating higher job satisfaction resulting
from the presence of sexual harassment law (Newman et al. 2003),2 and recent debates on cyber-
harassment,3 micro-aggression,4 trauma, trigger warnings, and safe spaces, as these debates share
some similarities with the earlier debates on sexual harassment law.5
Sexual harassment is perceived to be a major impediment to female labor force participation.6
Policymakers in both developed and developing countries have taken steps to address this problem.
For example, in India and Mexico, female-only trains and buses have been introduced so women
1In the early years of sexual harassment law, the dominant understanding of sexual harassment focused on the
sexualized nature of the harassment as the problem (bosses groping subordinates, sexualized insults, sleep with me
or you’re fired, etc). Schultz (1998) made a conceptual argument that sexual harassment is because of gender. So
when men on an almost-all-male factory floor sabotage the tools and equipment of the only woman working there in
an effort to push her to quit, that’s sexual harassment, even if nothing about it is sexualized.
2A recent study finds that 30% of students between 7th and 12th grade in the U.S. experienced sexual harassment
in the previous school year and 44% experienced in-person harassment. Negative effects such as absenteeism, poor
sleep, and stomachaches were reported by 87% of the harassed students (Hill and Kearl 2011).
3As the social norms change, courts continue to struggle with exactly how to define sexual harassment and whether
to include, for example, cyber-harassment (Franks 2011), as a form of sexual harassment.
4The University of California is considering guaranteeing a right to be free from verbal expressions
of intolerance and issued a list of suggested phrases to avoid: http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-
programs/_files/seminars/Tool_Recognizing_Microaggressions.pdf.
5Recently, the University of Oregon’s Bias Response Team summarized common practices on college campuses:
Students, faculty, and staff who feel threatened, harassed, intimidated, triggered, microaggressed, offended, ignored,
under-valued, or objectified because of their race, gender, gender identity, sexuality, disability status, mental health,
religion, political affiliation, or size are encouraged to contact the Bias Response Team, whose goal is to eradicate
bias on campus, making Oregon a safer place. Bias is defined as “any physical, spoken, or written act” that targets
another person, even unintentionally. The team’s posters propose examples of bias incidents: statements that qualify
include: “Thanks, sweetie,” “I don’t see color,” “Where are you from? But where are you really from?,” “I was joking,
don’t take things so seriously”.
6Men are also increasingly likely to bring sexual harassment claims. We focus on female sexual harassment plaintiffs
for brevity as the majority of lawsuits involve female plaintiffs.
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would face less harassment on their way to work. In the U.S., making the work environment friendlier
to women has been one of the most dramatic labor market changes in the past half-century. Yet, the
consequences of forbidding harassment on female labor force outcomes remain unknown. Forbid-
ding sexual harassment could have exacerbated gender inequality if the primary function of sexual
harassment law was to mandate a benefit, imposing costs on the targeted group through lower
wages or lower employment (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001), act as a tax on labor demand (Summers
1989), and make women more costly to hire (Epstein 1995), or it could have ameliorated gender
inequality by opening job opportunities in previously harassing work environments, as suggested by
an insider-outsider theory of involuntary unemployment (Lindbeck and Snower 1988). Under the
insider-outsider theory, sexual harassment exacerbates inequality by closing job opportunities in
harassing work environments. Previous evidence for the insider-outsider theory uses cross-sectional
analyses of firms (Lindbeck and Snower 2001) or lab experiments (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002). Since
sexual harassment laws in most countries are not implemented randomly, and sexual harassment
laws may have been a consequence of the increase in female labor force participation, establishing
the causal consequences of requiring insiders to stop harassing outsiders is challenging.7
This paper presents evidence using randomly assigned judges who have regional jurisdiction
setting legal precedent for millions of individuals residing in one of 12 U.S. Circuits and the fact
that judges’ biographies predict their decisions. Between 1982 and 2002, over 250 Circuit cases
addressing sexual harassment were decided in the United States, yielding roughly 126 experiments
across 21 years and 12 Circuits. While this number may seem small, analysis of state laws usually
examine the impact of up to 50 experiments in the U.S. or 34 in the OECD. Because judicial
composition of sexual harassment cases is unlikely to be correlated with subsequent labor market
outcomes other than through sexual harassment decisions, the random assignment of judges creates
exogenous variation in legal precedent that can be used to estimate the causal impact of court-made
sexual harassment law on workplace gender inequality.
In the following sections, we present an analysis of data on human resources policies, the Current
7Correspondence studies (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004) are precluded by the difficulty and plausibility of a
research design involving the randomization of everyday events that denigrate individuals because they are members of
particular groups (Pierce 1970; Rowe 1981). An alternative research design investigates the role of a phenomenon that
is closely related to sexual harassment–sexism or prejudice. This is the belief that minorities should appropriately
play only certain roles, or should know their “place” (Charles and Guryan 2008; Charles et al. 2010; Chen 2004).
Using a correlational approach, the authors find a positive correlation between prejudicial attitudes and labor market
inequality. A third kind of research design employs policy variation. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act increased minority employment shares by 0.5 to 1.1 percentage points per year (Chay 1998). Our research design
is closest to the third design, except that our policy variation is random.
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Population Survey, and data on sexual harassment decisions in Circuit and District Courts collected
by other authors and ourselves. Section 2 discusses theoretical and practical aspects of sexual ha-
rassment law, emphasizing how labor lawyers and human resources consultants greatly exaggerated
the risk of sexual harassment lawsuits after major Circuit decisions to motivate employers to make
human resources policy changes to forbid sexual harassment. Forbidding harassment allows outsider
women to enter the labor force as they can now compete for jobs previously dominated by men and
the insider women who tolerated sexual harassment. In the insider-outsider theory of Lindbeck and
Snower (2001), economic rents captured by insiders are dissipated when they can no longer harass
the outsiders, and on the margin, some insiders may leave.
It is important to note that the U.S. Federal Courts, and in particular, the U.S. Courts of Appeals
(also known as Circuit Courts), have strong impact on sexual harassment law. Only 2% of Circuit
cases successfully appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, so U.S. Courts of Appeals determine the vast
majority of decisions that set legal precedent and 98% of their decisions are final. Their decisions are
binding precedent within the Circuit, but not outside. They are persuasive precedent on the state
courts within the Circuit. Since the Courts of Appeals judges are revealed substantially after the
briefs are filed and after litigation costs have been sunk at both the District and Circuit Court level,
very few cases settle when the judges are revealed. We also note that the U.S. Courts of Appeal
only handles issues of new law–so we should not expect Circuit cases to influence the decision of a
subsequent case that appears in the court.8 The sample precedents that we discuss are indicative of
the rather different legal issue presented: whether to use the reasonable person or reasonable woman
standard for what constitutes sexual harassment, or, whether the plaintiff has to prove emotional
harm in court. To examine the economic impacts of these kinds of legal regulations whose effects
can appear with some delay, we present an empirical framework that allows for a delayed effect of
the law, and confirm the results are robust to modifying the basic specification.
Section 3 establishes that the random composition of judicial panels was related to sexual harass-
ment Circuit decisions. We assess randomization by examining whether judicial panel characteristics
were correlated with pre-trial characteristics (i.e., the facts of the case–who was involved, the egre-
giousness of the harm, etc.–as determined by the lower District Courts) and determining how similar
the string of judicial panel assignments was to a random string. Judge’s politics and gender predict
sexual harassment decisions (Farhang and Wawro 2004; Epstein 1995; Peresie 2005), but it has been
8In any event, when we run the reduced form relationship between previous judicial assignment and future laws,
there is little apparent effect.
4
argued that judges vote more along party lines than along gender lines (Dixon 2010), that U.S. Pres-
idents who appoint nontraditional (e.g., women) candidates take the opportunity to appoint more
ideologically extreme individuals (Asmussen 2011), and that female conservatives exhibit prejudice
against females (Eisenman 1991). In our setting, female Republicans were 18 percentage points less
supportive of sexual harassment plaintiffs, who were predominantly female, while male Democrats
were 13 percentage points more supportive of sexual harassment plaintiffs.9
Because judicial composition of sexual harassment judicial panels is unlikely to be correlated
with subsequent labor market outcomes other than through sexual harassment decisions, the ran-
dom panels of judges who decide differently from each other, and in a manner predicted by their
biographies, creates exogenous variation in appellate precedent forbidding sexual harassment that
can be used to estimate the causal impact of court-made sexual harassment law on gender inequal-
ity. We also collect data on judicial biographies to exploit the large variation in judicial decisions
that is due to random combinations of biographical characteristics, and employ a sparse model,
LASSO, to select among the combinatorial possible number of panel characteristics that predict
sexual harassment decisions (Belloni et al. 2012).
In Section 4, we consider whether firms subsequently adopt sexual harassment human resources
policies and whether females see improvements in labor market outcomes relative to males in Circuits
and years with more precedent that is favorable to sexual harassment plaintiffs. Two-stage least
squares estimates using this variation imply that forbidding sexual harassment spurred adoption of
human resources policies to address sexual harassment, and females were more likely to be employed
and report longer working hours and higher earnings relative to males. These outcomes decrease,
to some extent, for males.10
The presence of sexual harassment human resources policies grew from 15% in 1982 to 96% by
1997 (Dobbin and Kelly 2007), or roughly 5 percentage points per year. Our estimates indicate
that sexual harassment law spurred the adoption of sexual harassment human resources policies
equivalent to 37% of the yearly increase.11 Sexual harassment law also increased female employment
shares by an amount equivalent to what the Equal Employment Opportunity Act achieved for black
9As shorthand, we will refer to judges appointed by Democratic presidents as “Democrats” and to judges ap-
pointed by Republican presidents as “Republicans.” Democrats were 13 percentage points more supportive of sexual
harassment plaintiffs. Because female Republicans were more conservative than female Democrats were liberal, female
judges on net were 3 percentage points less supportive of sexual harassment plaintiffs.
10The point estimates of the individual lags weakly suggest that changes in human resources policies precede changes
in labor market inequality, though we cannot reject the possibility that these changes occured simultaneously.
11This calculation of equivalence takes into account the typical composition of sexual harassment cases and typical
number of cases.
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employment shares (Chay 1998).12 Whether these effects seem large or small depends on one’s
perspective, but the interpretation is subject to the usual caveats in the literature (Deaton 2010)—
causal effects are sufficient, but not necessary conditions for an outcome.13
In Section 5, we turn to three additional pieces of evidence for an insider-outsider theory of
harassment and involuntary unemployment. First, sexual harassment law should have larger effects
in industries with more sexual harassment, and the effects were greatest in the construction industry,
which had the highest rate of sexual harassment claims. Second, forbidding harassment should
increase female productivity, and sexual harassment law increased earnings per hour of female labor
force participants. Third, some females—those who previously obtained insider rents—may see less
benefit, especially as they faced increased competition from previously outsider females, and outsider
females gained six times more than insider females.14
Throughout the paper, we explore the robustness of our empirical design by changing our controls
and specifications. Several findings emerge: Social outcomes were not related to Circuit decisions
before they were made; results are robust to controls for Circuit-specific time trends, composition
of the pool of judges available to be assigned to panels, and state fixed effects; and results are
robust to dropping 1 Circuit at a time, varying the lag structure, and collapsing the data to the
Circuit-year level. Inferences are also similar using wild bootstrap and simulations that randomly
assign legal variation to another Circuit. As Barrios, Diamond, Imbens, and Kolesar (2012) write,
“if the covariate of interest is randomly assigned at the cluster level, only accounting for non-zero
covariances at the cluster level, and ignoring correlations between clusters, leads to valid standard
errors and confidence intervals,” which implies similar standard errors across the different methods
of accounting for clustering at the Circuit or Circuit-year level. In Section 6, we also present tests of
randomization, assess additional identification concerns, and present robustness to accounting for
the potential for litigants to pursue an appeal in response to prior years’ outcomes. We elaborate
on the use of randomly assigned judges in the lower courts (District Courts) from which an appeal
12It is also equivalent to 55% of a standard deviation in median male sexism (Charles et al. 2010).
13A defendant who shares the same first initial as a judge receives 8% longer sentences, but this effect only explains
0.03% variance (Chen and Prescott 2016). See also Deaton’s NYU “Debates in Development” lecture on the topic,
where he describes causal effects as Insufficient but Non-redundant parts of a condition which is Unnecessary but
Sufficient (INUS).
14We infer insider status by contrasting the experience of wage-earning women in the labor force with women
in the general population since we do not have a panel of individuals followed before and after decisions. When
the population sample is restricted to those in the labor force who report non-zero wages, sexual harassment law
exacerbated gender inequality in hours worked, earnings, and management status. Wages of all labor force participants
increased, and a portion of insider males exited in response to, or because of, the entrance of outsider females. Taking
these factors together suggests that outsider females gained 6 times more than insider females.
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arises as an additional source of exogenous variation to control for the presence of a case.
In Section 7, we present alternative theories, such as compensating differentials and selection,
and argue that they are less consistent with the data. As such, our results provide new evidence
on a debate regarding whether labor market gender inequality is due to unobserved physiologi-
cal differences, labor market choices, or discrimination (Summers 2005). In particular, our results
suggest that sometimes labor market choices, like the decision to participate, can be due to harass-
ment. Moreover, they provide evidence against the view that forbidding sexual harassment is only
an employment protection that imposed costs on the targeted group through lower wages or lower
employment as has been observed for other social policies (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Summers
1989; Epstein 1995). Instead, they provide empirical support for models that seek to enrich the role
of prejudice (Charles and Guryan 2008; Charles et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2016a) in contributing to the
gender wage gap (Card and DiNardo 2002; O’Neill 2003; Black and Strahan 2001). They are also
consistent with previous evidence on the effects of anti-discrimination law (Hellerstein et al. 2002;
Neumark and Stock 2006; Eberts and Stone 1985; Chay 1998). Our paper presents the advantage
of being based on randomization, where identification is more transparent.
Section 8 concludes with some remarks on directions for future research. Social scientists have
long speculated on the relationship between the innovation of rights and socio-economic conditions,
and scholarship to date has been unsatisfactory in exploring questions of causality vis-à-vis legal
precedent.15 Methods to evaluate the impact of court-made law may help judges who are interested
in the broader empirical consequences of their decisions. Judge Richard Posner has lamented that,
“[judicial] opinions lack the empirical support that is crucial to sound constitutional adjudication”
(Posner 1998); similarly Justice Breyer remarked, “I believe that a[n] interpretive approach that
undervalues consequences, by undervaluing related constitutional objectives, exacts a constitutional
price that is too high” (Breyer 2006). While a fair number of studies have employed the random
assignment of judges to identify the impact of judicial decisions on the subsequent outcomes of liti-
gants (Kling 2006; Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2013; Dahl, Kostøl, and Mogstad 2014), our analysis
is different in scope. We would like to estimate laws’ effects that incorporate general equilibrium re-
sponse to the law, and we capture the general equilibrium effects because our randomization occurs
at the national level rather than the individual level.16
15Socioeconomic conditions can drive judicial decisions or court decisions may affect society (Chen and Yeh 2014b;
Chen 2015).
16General equilibrium effects can include (but are not restricted to) capital and labor migration across Circuits.
Of course, since our unit of analysis is Circuit-year, we are subject to the usual concern that the Circuit-years are, at
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2 Background
2.1 Theory Forbidding sexual harassment would have significant labor market consequences
in an insider-outsider theory of harassment and involuntary unemployment (Lindbeck and Snower
1988; Schultz 1990). In this model, while harassment is allowed, outsiders are unable to find jobs
even though they are prepared to work for less than the prevailing wages of incumbent workers
(insiders). The outsiders cannot underbid insiders; if they did and were to become new employees,
insiders would withdraw cooperation and make the work experience of these entrants unpleasant.
In other words, insiders would harass the entrants, thereby reducing their productivity. Firms,
therefore, find it costly to substitute outsiders for insiders. These harassment and labor turnover
costs create economic rents, which the insiders capture via wage setting, and as a result, involuntary
unemployment arises. Outsiders are unable to find work even though they would be just as profitable
to the firm as the insiders, provided they faced identical conditions of employment. The insiders’
harassment activities, however, ensure that conditions are not the same for insiders and outsiders.
Applying this insider-outsider theory in its simplest form assumes that females are outsiders
and men are insiders. Under these assumptions, forbidding harassment can increase the employ-
ment and wages of outsiders. Insider males would no longer be allowed to engage in harassment
activities, thereby raising the productivity of females. Firms would be willing to hire females, so
their employment and wages would increase. Of course, not all females are outsiders; hence, some
females—those who previously obtained the insider rents—may see less benefit in their employment
outcomes, especially as they faced increased competition from previously outsider females.
An alternative view suggests that sexual harassment law may have been a tax on the hiring of
women, making it more costly to hire women (Epstein 1995). The law, like an unfunded, mandated
benefit, may act like a tax on labor demand (Summers 1989). These theoretical effects are described
and analogized to those of accommodation mandates (Jolls 2001). Similar to the unfunded mandate
in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), all of the direct and indirect costs of sexual harass-
ment law on firms—from establishing internal infrastructures conducive to complaint to marginal
costs associated with each female worker who has some probability of filing a complaint or becoming
a litigant—may have been passed onto women and lowered their wages or employment relative to
first glance, analyzed as separate labor markets. However, we note that since our randomization occurs nationally and
repeatedly, the general equilibrium effects of labor or capital mobility across Circuit-years are incorporated into our
estimates, and these would be the estimates a judge may be interested in. The precedents themselves may eventually
spill over across circuits but it is not immediate, and citation analysis indicates that the precedential impact is 10
times greater within the Circuit than outside.
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men. While the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (see U.S.C. § 206(d)) makes lower wages for women for the
same work illegal, women’s wages could be constrained through a failure to promote given the same
qualifications or through the offering of fringe benefits packages designed to appeal to some workers
but not others.
Assuming that the effects of sexual harassment law were predominantly experienced by women,
forbidding harassment may further lower female wages by increasing the supply of female labor
by making it more pleasant for women who would be willing to work for lower wages in work
environments that previously allowed harassment. If employees value the benefit at cost, the resulting
equilibrium will result in the same level of employment but with the full cost reflected in lower
wages (Basu 2003). If there are wage rigidities, then the cost of the benefit cannot be reflected
in wages, and thus unemployment may result (Summers 1989). Some recent empirical work has
found that similar social policies regulating labor markets, such as the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and maternity mandates, had detrimental effects on the groups they were intended to
protect and undoing, in part, the redistributive goals of these policies (ADA: Acemoglu and Angrist
2001; Employment protection: Autor et al. 2006; Maternity mandates: Gruber 1994). There are,
however, reasons to think that employers are less likely to experience sexual harassment law as
an unfunded mandated benefit since it may be difficult to know in advance who is going to be
a sexual harassment plaintiff and men could bear some of the cost of the mandated benefit as
potential harassers. Whether forbidding sexual harassment exacerbates gender inequality is a priori
ambiguous and this motivates our empirical investigation.
At a practical level, sexual harassment law–which is primarily court-made–and the imposition of
direct and indirect litigation costs has impacted firm behavior in at least three ways. First, for those
cases that were actually litigated, the law resulted in direct litigation costs and potentially large
damage awards. Second, the potential for litigation likely led many firms to settle with potential
plaintiffs, particularly after such plaintiffs filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and received a right to sue letter from the agency. Third, as has been docu-
mented by sociologists and legal ethnographers (Dobbin and Kelly 2007; Edelman 1992; Edelman
et al. 1999), labor lawyers and human resources consultants greatly exaggerated the risk of sexual
harassment suit after major Circuit decisions in human resources management publications and
in law review articles. Initial surveys reported that 90% of women experienced sexual harassment,
when later surveys found that only a small fraction actually did. Rapid change in case law added to
9
the uncertainty. Our own discussions with labor lawyers indicate how fearful employers have been of
Title VII suits. Furthermore, sexual harassment cases tend to be personal allegations, which could
cause risk-averse employees to change behavior in a way exceeding that of their response to gender
discrimination, ADA, or maternity mandate lawsuits, whose resolution can turn on evidence that
is likely to be more statistical in nature.
Interviews with hundreds of firms from a representative sample of U.S. businesses with 50 or more
employees suggest that these labor lawyers and human resources consultants were quite effective in
translating Circuit decisions into human resources policy changes (Dobbin and Kelly 2007). Millions
of dollars were spent on training programs and establishing grievance procedures aimed to reduce
the risk of lawsuit more than to reduce the incidence of harassment. For example, more grievance
procedures were established than maternity leaves, even though the law mandated maternity leaves
in no uncertain terms and grievance procedures were not part of a bright-line rule until 1998,
when the Supreme Court said grievance procedures greatly reduced the liability faced by firms.
Many firms invested in formal grievance procedures, in part because of the advice of personnel
experts who believed that instituting formal grievance procedures analogous to those for civil rights
violations would help defend against damage awards. Some firms mandated training akin to the
diversity training implemented in response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to educate their workers
about sexual harassment. This last approach was controversial since some firms and attorneys feared
that such training might make potential plaintiffs more aware of harassment and, therefore, more
likely to sue. In the end, it is an empirical question whether firms responded to sexual harassment
precedent. We employ a dataset on human resources policies (Dobbin and Kelly 2007) to investigate
the timing of adoption of sexual harassment grievance procedures and policies in response to sexual
harassment law. The adoption of human resources policies is, of course, only one channel through
which sexual harassment law can have labor market consequences. Women could be encouraged to
enter the work force even in the absence of firm policy changes if they felt they were more likely to
win in the event of a sexual harassment suit.
An important theoretical critique of anti-discrimination law suggests that profit-maximizing firms
have their own incentives not to discriminate (Becker 1968; Epstein 1995). Similar arguments could
be applied (and rebutted) in the context of sexual harassment law. Profit-maximizing firms should
have their own incentive to forbid harassment and retain outsider workers at higher productivity,
so forbidding sexual harassment with its accompanying litigation and human resources cost should
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have no effect and could be inefficient. However, there are at least three reasons why firms might not
forbid harassment on their own (Lindbeck and Snower 1988). First, insider employees may be risk
averse; forbidding harassment could change the insider profit-sharing scheme and thereby impose
additional risk on insider employees, who then suffer a utility loss. The firm may be unable to
compensate them for this loss. Second, an insider cooperates with entrants if his gains, a share of
the additional profit resulting from his cooperation, exceed his losses in market power as his wage
falls towards his reservation wage. However, this only happens if the firm relinquishes a share of gross
profit, something that may make it a net loser compared to other firms. Agency and transaction
costs may prevent Coasian bargaining between insiders and the firm. Then the firm has no incentive
to implement the new contract. Third, there may be additional sources of labor turnover costs
preventing firms from simply replacing all the insiders with outsiders. Entry of firms that hire the
outsiders may not occur due to setup costs, capital market imperfections, scarcity of entrepreneurial
skills, and reduction of product prices. A legal regime equalizes the playing field across all firms
when no firm by itself would have the incentive to forbid harassment. As economic rents captured
by insiders are dissipated when they can no longer harass the outsiders, so on the margin, some
insiders may leave.17
2.2 Design of Study The correlation between court-made law and economic outcomes is gen-
erally difficult to interpret since the causality may run in both directions and the relationship may
reflect omitted variables. Momentous judicial decisions may be caused by rather than be causes of
political or socioeconomic changes.18 In addition, with cross-fertilization across different areas of
legal doctrine, if different, but related (i.e., correlated), doctrinal areas have independent effects
on employment outcomes, social changes may be misattributed to one legal rule when many legal
rules are changing simultaneously. The ideal research design randomly assigns individuals or firms
to different legal rules to help resolve uncertainty aboout consequential impacts of law (Abramowicz
et al. 2011). Thankfully, judges do not randomize their decisions, but the random assignment of
judges provides a close approximation.
17Sexual harassment is not limited to the young: 25% of sexual harassment complaints are filed by individuals over
35 (Coles 1986). The definition of insiders and outsiders may be continually evolving, and individuals may feel a duty
to exclude outsiders (Chen 2006, 2010; Chen and Schonger 2013). Voice-based snap judgments of perceived masculinity
based solely on the introductory sentences of lawyers arguing in front of the Supreme Court of the United States
negatively predict outcomes in the Court. From an economic perspective, correlations between malleable advocate
characteristics and high-stakes outcomes in the United States Supreme Court should not persist unless law firms
believe that that masculine voices are more likely to win or have a preference for masculine-sounding lawyers (Chen
et al. 2016b).
18The diaries of Supreme Court Justices suggest that social factors influenced their decisions (Klarman 2004).
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We exploit a natural experiment where pro-plaintiff sexual harassment precedent varies randomly
by Circuit and over time due to the random assignment of judges to Circuit panels. Five aspects of
the U.S. judicial system are important for the development of this identification strategy. First, the
United States has a common law system where American judges not only apply the law but also
make the law: Judge’s decisions in current cases become precedent for use in decisions in future cases
in the same court and in lower courts of the same jurisdiction.19 The lower courts are the District
Courts, which are the courts of general jurisdiction and hold trials. There are three layers of courts
in the U.S. federal judicial system. When trial cases are appealed, they go to appellate courts,
referred to as Circuit Courts. Only 2-3% of Circuit cases are appealed again to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Therefore, Circuit Courts are quite active in shaping law. They handle the vast majority
of cases deciding issues of new law and provide new interpretations or distinctions of pre-existing
precedents or statutes.
Second, Circuit Courts are only to hear cases presenting new legal issues (only 10-20% of District
Court opinions are appealed). Circuit Courts are credited with continually finding new distinctions
with which to expand or contract the space under which an actor would be found liable (Gen-
naioli and Shleifer 2007). The appendix provides a timeline of the major developments in sexual
harassment doctrine. For examples of how doctrinal shifts could make it easier for subsequent sex-
ual harassment plaintiffs to bring and win suit, consider in Ellison v. Brady, the replacement of a
“reasonable person” standard with a “reasonable woman” standard for determining whether sexual
harassment occurred, and in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the elimination of the requirement to
prove psychological harm in courts. These doctrinal developments are typical of the cases in the
Circuit Courts. Moreover, cases representing big legal changes occur throughout the time period.
Third, there are twelve Circuit Courts, each in charge of a geographic region (comprising 4-9
states) of the United States, known as a Circuit (See Figure 1). As such, Circuit decisions in one
Circuit do not establish precedent that other Circuits must necessarily follow. When Circuits choose
to adopt the precedent of another Circuit, it is typically with some delay. For example, a new case
bringing the same issue of law must be filed in a District Court, appealed to the Circuit Court,
decided upon, and have an opinion issued before the doctrine becomes binding precedent in the new
Circuit.
19Circuit decisions are binding precedent only in the Circuit of the court delivering the opinion; that is, the
District Courts within a Circuit and the Circuit Court itself must follow the precedent set by the Circuit Court’s
prior decisions. This premise has been checked empirically using a research design with the random assignment of
judges (Chen et al. 2014a).
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Fourth, judges are randomly assigned in Circuit Courts, three judges to each case. Some judges
take a reduced caseload, but all are randomly assigned by a computer algorithm. Section 6 reports
tests of randomization. Judges’ names are typically not revealed to the litigating parties until after
they file their briefs–sometimes only a few days before the hearing, if there is a hearing. Because
judges are appointed for life by the U.S. president, and a Circuit can have 20-40 judges in the
pool available to be assigned, we observe that the number of possible combinations of judges or
combinations of judicial demographic characteristics on a panel is very large. This variation renders
a large amount of experimental variation with which to identify causal effects.
Fifth, identification also hinges on whether sexual harassment cases assigned to judges with
different background characteristics do in fact have different outcomes. Experience, legal philosophy,
or group identity may cause judges to view issues in different ways.20 A number of papers have
documented the effect of judges’ demographic background on sexual harassment cases (Farhang
and Wawro 2004; Epstein 1995; Peresie 2005). The prior literature, focusing on gender and politics,
indicates that judges vote more along party lines than by gender and that female conservatives are
more hardline conservative on gender issues (Eisenman 1991; Dixon 2010). Presidents who appoint
nontraditional (e.g., women) candidates take the opportunity to appoint more ideologically extreme
individuals than they would otherwise (Asmussen 2011). The fact that some judges are more extreme
than others allow us to construct a setting akin to a randomized experiment in the establishment
of precedent across different regions of the United States.21
20A large literature documents that judicial decisions are correlated with their biographical characteristics or
experience. Some papers show evidence that may have a causal interpretation, for example, that Circuit Court judges
behave more partisan before Presidential elections, that wins and losses of sports games affect judicial decisions,
that matching first initials with a randomly assigned defendant affects decisions, and that decisions are affected by
decisions on recent cases (Berdejó and Chen 2014; Chen and Spamann 2014; Chen and Prescott 2016; Chen 2016;
Chen et al. 2015). Further, the explanatory power of these factors persist after employing the best prediction models
of judges’ decisions (Barry et al. 2016; Chen and Eagel 2016; Chen et al. 2016c,d).
21Our research design can be further clarified by the following illustration. Consider a Circuit with a high proportion
of judges who are extreme. The designation of extreme is not meant to imply that extreme judges are less reasonable
or accurate in their decisions. Rather, extreme judges are those who tend to, for example, vote for plaintiffs more so
than the average judge. The empirical strategy does not rely on cases getting more extreme judges in this Circuit as
opposed to another Circuit, which could be different for a variety of reasons. Rather, the strategy relies on the fact
that, from year to year, the proportion of cases for a particular case category in this Circuit that are assigned extreme
judges varies in a random manner. The idiosyncratic variation is not expected beforehand since judicial assignment
is not revealed to parties until very late in the appellate process and after each litigant’s briefs are filed. In the
years when an unexpectedly high number of extreme judges are assigned to panels for a particular case category,
the proportion of cases for that case category that will result in pro-plaintiff precedent is also high. Even though we
cannot ask any particular Circuit to randomize their decisions, a randomized control trial is in effect created through
the random assignment of judges who interpret the facts and the law differently. Random variation in the assignment
of Circuit judges is an attractive instrument for a number of reasons. The random assignment of judges is exogenous
and unexpected. It varies in both the cross-section and the time-series, so it does not rely on strong assumptions
about the comparability of different regions (e.g., Circuits) and years. The enormous variation in legal decisions due
to the judicial panel composition also makes the empirical design an ideal setup to study the consequences of law.
See Chen and Yeh (2013) for an extended, non-technical discussion of the empirical intuition.
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We use this variation to identify the effects of sexual harassment law on human resources policies
and gender inequality in the labor market. We should expect to see an effect of Circuit judicial
decisions if judges follow precedent and Circuit decisions on the margin make it easier for subse-
quent plaintiffs to bring and win suit. For example, shifting from a reasonable person standard to
a reasonable woman standard in defining sexual harassment would make it easier for subsequent
plaintiffs to bring and win suit. We might then expect firms and individuals to respond to Cir-
cuit decisions, whether through newspaper publicity, advocates, lawyers, or information consultants
greatly exaggerating the risk of suit after major Circuit decisions.22
2.3 Testing the Empirical Predictions of the Theory The most robust prediction of the
insider-outsider theory, which sets it in contrast with a world where sexual harassment law is solely a
mandated benefit whose costs are borne on those whom the law is intended to help, is that outcomes
are likely to differ in Circuit-years that issue pro-plaintiff sexual harassment jurisprudence in a
manner that favors females (relative to males). To test this, we will simply compare the outcomes
in Circuit-years with pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant sexual harassment jurisprudence and perform
robustness checks to confirm that the difference seems to be due to sexual harassment jurisprudence.
To link legal precedent with labor force participation, we parameterize φ(y) = eρLawctAct. Con-
sider a general dynamic growth equation for labor force participation:
yct = Act + α1yct−1 + ...+ αnyct−n + ρ0Lawct + ρ1Lawct−1 + ...+ ρnLawct−n + εct(1)
allowing participation to depend on n lags of past participation and adding an error term.
We assume that Act evolves according to:
ΔAct = gc + γ0Lawct + ...+ γnLawct−n(2)
This allows both current and lagged jurisprudence to affect the growth rate of A.
SubstitutingΔAct into a first differenced version of yct yields a dynamic panel estimation equation
of the form:
Δyct = gc + α1Δyct−1 + ...+ αnΔyct−n + γ0Lawct + ...+ γnLawct−n+
ρ0ΔLawct + ρ1ΔLawct−1 + ...+ ρnΔLawct−n +Δεct
(3)
The “level effects” of law on output appear through ρ. The “growth effects” of law appear through
γ. Rewriting the ΔLaw terms as Law terms yields:
22Circuit decisions have been shown to affect stock market outcomes (Araiza et al. 2014). Another study finds that
Supreme Court cases from 1999–2013 collectively moved $140 billion in stock prices (Katz et al. 2015).
14
Δyct = gc + α1Δyct−1 + ...+ αnΔyct−n + (γ0 + ρ0)Lawct + (γ1 + ρ1 − ρ0)Lawct−1 + ...
+(γn + ρn − ρn−1)Lawct−n − ρnLawct−n−1 +Δεct
(4)
Relabeling the coefficients on Law yields:
Δyct = gc + α1Δyct−1 + ...+ αnΔyct−n +
n+1∑
j=0
βjLawcj +Δεct(5)
To find the growth effect, consider Δyct−j = Δy and Lawcj = Law. Solving yields:
Δyc =
gc
1− α1 − ...− αn +
∑n+1
j=0 βj
1− α1 − ...− αnLawc(6)
so that the growth effect of jurisprudence is simply
∑n+1
j=0
βj
1−α1−...−αn , which is identical to
∑n
j=0
γj
1−α1−...−αn
since the ρ terms all cancel.
As we find variation in Law that is randomly assigned, we focus on αj = 0 for all j and estimate:
gct = θc + θt +
L∑
n=0
βt−nLawct−n +Δεct(7)
where θc are Circuit fixed effects, θt are time fixed effects, and Lawct is a vector of annual ju-
risprudence with up to L lags included. This equation captures the growth effect of law, e.g., the
effect of law on aspects of the economy, such as human resource policies, that influence labor force
participation.
The growth equation allows separate identification of level effects and growth effects through
the examination of βj . In particular, both effects influence the growth rate in the initial period.
The difference is that the level effect eventually reverses itself. For example, a jurisprudential shock
may affect social activism, but after a few periods, activism returns to normal. By contrast, the
growth effect appears during the jurisprudential shock and is not reversed. A failure to innovate
in one period leaves the Circuit permanently further behind. The growth effect is identified as the
summation of the jurisprudential effects over time. Following the convention in the growth literature,
we are interested in the distributed lag effect and test for joint significance of the lags.
Another way to think about our research design is that laws are not likely to have an immediate
impact. Firms may need time to adjust to a new legal regime; alternatively, the effects of a law
change may fade as expectations adjust. To estimate the delayed effects of the law, we estimate a
distributed lag specification. Thus we need to also control for the presence of a Circuit case, and we
exploit variation in the presence of a Circuit case that comes from the random assignment of District
Court judges. We assume that the demographic characteristics of District judges are correlated with
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the likelihood of an appeal (since District judges’ characteristics are correlated with the likelihood
of reversal (Haire, Songer, and Lindquist 2003; Sen 2015; Barondes 2010; Steinbuch 2009), but not
with socioeconomic outcomes other than through the courts.23 Then, our specification should be
invariant to the number of lags and leads. The use of leads serves as a check of the identification
strategy, namely, whether the assignment of judges to sexual harassment cases may be endogenous
to other factors that correlate with socio-economic outcomes.
Our data on labor force outcomes are repeated-cross sections, so we will estimate the growth
equation in levels. This means that a level effect is inferred from a persistent set of lags and a
growth effect from a set of lags that grow over time. In contrast, convergence in institutions and
behavior is inferred from lags that fade over time. To sum up, the simple insider-outsider model of
involuntary unemployment contrasts the view of sexual harassment law as a mandated benefit that
hurts those intended for help. If forbidding sexual harassment is a mandated benefit, the resulting
equilibrium will result in the same level of employment but with the full cost reflected in lower
wages, or if there are wage rigidities, unemployment may result. If forbidding sexual harassment
prevents insiders from excluding outsiders, labor market outcomes increase along both margins.
2.4 Data Collection Our empirical analysis draws on several sources of data on sexual ha-
rassment cases—an established dataset as well as our own data collection of Circuit and District
Court cases.
The first dataset is from Boyd et al. (2010), which codes case characteristics, such as the presence
of certain fact patterns and legal issues for a subset of Title VII discrimination claims in the Chicago
Judges Project data (Sunstein et al. 2006). We use this data to perform a randomization check,
namely, if pre-trial case characteristics are correlated with the assignment of the Circuit Court
judge.
Our second dataset is composed of our own collection of cases from 1982 to 2002 of all sexual
harassment cases brought in an employment context. An earlier draft of the paper used the Chicago
Judges Project data, which coded sexual harassment cases from 1995-2002, and found similar results.
We follow the data collection and coding method in the Chicago Judges Project and extend the
analysis back to 1982 to examine the impact of the totality of sexual harassment cases. The EEOC
first issued guidelines with the term “sexual harassment” in 1980. Before 1982, there were very few
23To be sure, we are not identifying the causal effects of the presence of a Circuit case. The assignment of a District
judge can affect the Circuit panel’s decision. We want to identify a portion of the law that is not coming from other
social trends or areas of law, and this portion comes from the random assignment of federal judges.
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sexual harassment cases, so our search method obtains very few cases in the early years. More
than one case per year is needed because our main specification includes year fixed effects. Figure
2 plots the growth in sexual harassment cases, number of pro-plaintiff decisions, and number of
pro-defendant decisions during this time period. The coding of the vote follows the coding method
used in the Chicago Judges Project database: pro-plaintiff vote if the plaintiff was afforded any
relief. Table I indicates that on average, there were 0.996 sexual harassment panels per Circuit-year
for a total of 251 cases. A sizeable portion of Circuit-years, 51%, had no sexual harassment panel.
Roughly 67% of the decisions were pro-plaintiff.
Our third dataset comprise of District Court cases, collected using a similar methodology as for
the Circuit Court collection. We searched Westlaw using “((SEX! +2 DISCRIMINATION) (GEN-
DER +2 DISCRIMINATION)) & (SEX! +2 HARASSMENT)”. This resulted in 3,754 cases between
1982 and 2002.
Our fourth dataset is information on judges’ characteristics from the Appeals Court Attribute
Data, District Court Attribute Data,24 Federal Judicial Center, and our own data collection.25 We
filled in missing data by searching transcripts of Congressional confirmation hearings and other
official or news publications on Lexis. The average Circuit-year had 18.50 judges available for as-
signment to panels. The expected number of male Democrats per seat was 0.33. We calculate the
expectations based on the composition of the Circuit pool of judges available to be assigned in any
Circuit-year assuming that all judges have an equal probability of assignment. We weight senior
judges according to the frequency that a typical senior judge sits on cases. Additional summary
statistics are displayed in Table I.
Our fifth dataset on courts involves administrative data from the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts (AOC) and PACER filings on District Court cases26 to obtain judge identities that are
missing in the AOC data. We use this data to perform a test related to the identification assumption.
Our data on outcomes comes from two established sources, the Current Population Survey and
a dataset of workplaces interviewed on their human resource policies dating back to 1965.
24http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.html
25Variables include: geographic history, education, occupational history, governmental positions, military service,
religion, race, gender, and political affiliations. Raw data on religion come from Goldman (1999). Sisk’s data are
available at http://courseweb.stthomas.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.htm. Judges whose religions remained
missing or unknown were coded as having no publicly known religious affiliation. As political and social issues divide
along religious lines, it is reasonable to hypothesize that judges from different religions come to different conclusions
in court cases (Chen and Lind 2007, 2014). One of the coauthors collected these additional religious and personal
attributes (Chen and Yeh 2014a).
26Sixteen years of Public Access to Court Electronic Records are available on open source sites for 33 Districts.
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TABLE I
Summary Statistics
Mean
Circuit-Year Level (Standard Deviation)
Number of Judges 18.504
(7.356)
Number of Panels 0.996
(1.471)
Proportion of Circuit-Years with No Panels 51%
Proportion of Pro-Plaintiff Decisions 67%
when Circuit-Year has Panels
Expected # of Females per Seat 0.117
(0.081)
Expected # of Democrats 0.407
per Seat (0.121)
Expected # of Female Republicans 0.035
per Seat (0.040)
Expected # of Male Democrats 0.326
per Seat (0.119)
N (Circuit-years) 252
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First, we obtained labor market outcomes from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG)
Current Population Survey (CPS), which contains individual employment outcomes, including
weekly earnings, amount of time worked, employment status, and management status. The primary
variable of interest is the distinction between no-employment (including non-labor force partici-
pants) vs. part- or full-time employment. Non-labor force participants include discouraged workers.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Persons who are neither employed nor unemployed are
not in the labor force. This category includes retired persons, students, those taking care of children
or other family members and others who are neither working nor seeking work." We assume these
discouraged workers are outsiders in an insider-outsider theory of involuntary unemployment.
Earnings are adjusted to be in 2000 real terms. In addition, logs are taken of 1+earnings. We use
hours worked last week instead of usual weekly hours because usual weekly hours are not consistently
available (Autor et al. 2005). We recode the number of hours worked as zero for individuals who
are not in the labor force or not employed. We also recode their log earnings as zero. Some studies
drop these individuals and find a smaller difference in labor market outcomes between men and
women. We include individuals not in the labor force since the insider-outsider theory of involuntary
unemployment considers the entire population, not just those who are in the labor force or employed,
since discouraged workers may leave the labor market. We later restrict the sample to labor force
participants for the analysis of insiders. The designation of labor force participants as insiders does
not mean we assume that all labor force participants are harassing non-participants.
Management status is a binary indicator for whether an individual has an administrator, official,
public administration, executive, or other management-related occupation. Occupation is available
for about 90% of the unemployed and 33% of those not in the labor force, about 10% of which are
managerial. Respondents may interpret this question as being about their previous job. The CPS
also contains demographic controls, including age, sex, race, marital status, educational attainment,
and the geographic location of the individual, which allows us to match the individual’s state of
residence to the Circuit having legal jurisdiction. We weight our analysis with CPS-provided weights.
We measure the presence of firm-level sexual harassment policies in a national sample of 389
workplaces interviewed in 1997 on the history of human resources practices dating back to 1965.
This data was collected by Dobbin and Kelly (2007). They report a response rate of 56% but
found no bias in survey response along observable characteristics: establishment size, organization
size, subsidiary status, branch/headquarter status, region, and female chief executive. There is no
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variable indicating whether the firm had offices in multiple Circuits. Estimated effects would be
biased towards 0 to the extent that firms make HR decisions at a level that transcends Circuit
boundaries.
2.5 Specification Thanks to the randomization built into the U.S. Federal Courts, the basic
empirical specification is straightforward. The effect of sexual harassment jurisprudence is obtained
by comparing the means of the outcomes of interest after pro-plaintiff precedent and pro-defendant
precedent. Note that this difference is not an estimate of the comparison between pro-plaintiff
precedent and no precedent. The employer and employee activities can be different than what they
would have been if there was no precedent whatsoever. We are mostly interested in the effect of
pro-plaintiff, rather than pro-defendant precedent, when there is a precedent, as this would be the
effect of the decision of a judge deliberating on the case.
Denoting Y ict as the value of the outcome of interest for individual (employer or employee) i and
Lawct as a dummy equal to 1 if the decision was pro-plaintiff, this estimate is simply:
E[Y ict|Lawct = 1]− E[Y ict|Lawct = 0] ≡ β1.(8)
For female labor market outcomes, we expect β1 < 0 for at least one dimension of wages or
employment if forbidding sexual harassment is a mandated benefit whose costs are borne out on
women. However, for an insider-outsider theory, we expect β1 > 0 for wages and employment if
insiders are prevented from lowering the productivity of outsiders.
Since we are interested in effects over time, we specify a distributed lag and extend our specifi-
cation to include the presence of a decision, 1 [Mct−n > 0]. We focus on five years of lags and one
lead (n = −1 to 5) and vary the lag structure for robustness. M is the number of cases, which is
typically 0 or 1 (so typically Lawc(t−n) is 1 (100% pro-plaintiff) or 0 (100% pro-defendant)). Since
our outcome data is yearly, we take the average law measurements in each Circuit-year. We also
considered weighting our estimates by the number of cases in a Circuit-year, where weights are the
geometric mean of Mc(t−n) + 1 over the distributed lag. The statistical significance of the results
increases, so we present more conservative estimates without weighting.
gct = θc + θt +
L∑
n=0
β1t−nLawct−n +
L∑
n=0
β2t−n1 [Mct−n > 0] + εct(9)
Analogizing to coin flips, β1 captures the effect of the heads-or-tails coin flip (pro-plaintiff vs. pro-
defendant precedent), β1 + β2 captures the effect of the heads coin flip and the presence of the coin
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(pro-plaintiff precedent vs. no decision), and β2 captures the effect of the tails coin flip and the
presence of the coin (pro-defendant precedent vs. no decision).
We examine several outcomes: presence of sexual harassment policy, employment status, hours
worked, earnings, and management status.27 We will test whether there are differences in outcomes
by gender by running the regression:28
Yict = θc + θt +
∑L
n=0 β3t−nLawct−n +
∑L
n=0 β4t−n1 [Mct−n > 0]+∑L
n=0 β5t−nLawct−n ∗ Fict +
∑L
n=0 β6t−n1 [Mct−n > 0] ∗ Fict + ηXict + εict
(10)
Fict represents a dummy indicator for being female. We expect β5 < 0 if females are adversely
affected by sexual harassment law and β5 > 0 if females benefit from sexual harassment law. We
report the average and the individual coefficients. We consider n = 0 as a lag because some statistics
refer to calendar year. Most of the effects appear with some slight delay so excluding n = 0 in joint
significance tests does not affect our results.
In principle, we have 252 experiments (across 21 years and 12 Circuits). With random treatment
assignment, adding controls can add precision to the estimates if the controls are strong predictors of
the outcomes. We show that our main estimates are robust in Table VI to the inclusion or exclusion
of:
• Circuit-fixed effects, θc, and time-fixed effects, θt;
• Circuit-specific time trends to allow different Circuits to be on different trajectories with
respect to outcomes;
• A vector of observable unit characteristics, Xict, such as age, gender, educational attainment,
and race, which each enter as dummies with the exception of age;
• and time-varying Circuit-level controls, such as the characteristics of the pool of judges avail-
able to be assigned in Circuit c and time t− n.
The firm-level analysis uses the same controls as Dobbin and Kelly (2007): number of employees,
percent of women at location, sex of top executive named, percent women among named executives,
age of establishment, dummies for manufacturing, service, and trucking, regional unemployment
rate, and percent female in industry.
As Barrios, Diamond, Imbens, and Kolesar (2012) write, “if the covariate of interest is randomly
27Because management status includes previous job, we only examine this outcome when examining the sample of
labor force participants.
28 We do not interact the legal precedent with the gender indicator for our firm-level analysis.
21
assigned at the cluster level, only accounting for non-zero covariances at the cluster level, and
ignoring correlations between clusters, leads to valid standard errors and confidence intervals,” so
we expect to see similar results whether clustering standard errors at the Circuit or Circuit-year
level (Barrios et al. (2012) show that random assignment of treatment addresses serial and spatial
correlation across treatment units). Our results are also unaffected using the standard approach with
U.S. data, 50 state clusters (see Table VI). Table VI also reports regressions where each datapoint
corresponds to 1 experimental subject (21 years x 12 Circuits). We check results using randomization
inference that assigns the legal variation to another Circuit and using wild bootstrap. In addition,
the leads specification serves as an omnibus check for insufficient adjustment of standard errors. A
prior draft clusters standard errors at the Circuit-year level and this draft clusters at the Circuit
level, and the results are unchanged.29
Court decisions requiring female friendly work environments may have occurred as a consequence
of the labor market entry of females, leading to an upward bias in OLS estimates. On the other
hand, if labor market entry of females is too low, courts may be more likely to require female friendly
work environments, leading to a downward bias in OLS estimates. Therefore, ascertaining a causal
effect from judicial decisions to social trends is difficult without idiosyncratic variation in judicial
decisions. Since Lawct and ict may be correlated due to uncontrolled-for social trends or other legal
developments that correlate both with Lawct and outcomes Yict, we develop an instrumental variable
for Lawct using judges’ biographical characteristics. We use biographical characteristics because the
number of sexual harassment cases yields sharp demographic effects but not judge-specific effects, as
there are too few cases with which to identify judge-specific effects. In this paper, we do not analyze
heterogeneity in terms of, e.g., early or late pro-plaintiff decisions, or the compounding effects of,
e.g., pro-plaintiff decisions, and only analyze the average effects.
We drop the subscript n to ease the following exposition. Let Nct be the number of judges
assigned to sexual harassment panels who are female Republican. Figures 3A and 3B illustrate the
identification strategy. The jagged line displays NctMct and the smooth line displays E(
Nct
Mct
) in each of
the 12 Circuits. The smooth lines indicate the underlying variation in judge-specific characteristics
within Circuits over time. The jagged line indicates the random year-to-year variation in female
Republicans per seat. We estimate how outcomes respond to idiosyncratic variation in NctMct .
More formally, let pct = NctMct ∗1 [Mct > 0], i.e., defined to be 0 when 1 [Mct > 0] = 0. Then: E[(pct−
29We thank our NBER discussant Bentley MacLeod for recommending that we cluster at the Circuit level.
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E(pct))εict] = Pr[Mct > 0]E[(pct−E(pct))εict|Mct > 0]+Pr[Mct = 0]E[(pct−E(pct))εict|Mct = 0] =
0. Next, E[(pct − E(pct))εict] = E(pctεict) − E[E(pct)εict] = E(pctεict) − E(pct)E(εict) = E[pctεict].
Thus, pct and pct−E(pct) both serve as valid instruments. Notably, as Table VI shows, the results are
unaffected by controlling for E(pct). This draft presents estimates using the following identification
assumption (i.e., moment condition) for causal interpretation: E[NctMct εict|E(NctMct ), 1 [Mct > 0]] = 0.
Previous drafts obtained similar results using E[Nctεict|E(NctMct ),1 [Mct > 0] ,Mct] = 0, which looks at
the number of pro-plaintiff decisions controlling for the number of decisions, andE[Nctεict|E(NctMct ),1 [Mct > 0] , Qct] =
0, which controls for the size of the court docket and checks if pro-plaintiff vs. pro-defendant de-
cisions had opposite-signed effects. All lags and leads of Lawct are instrumented for in the actual
implementation. As standard, we also lag and interact the instruments as we lag and interact Lawct.
For example, if a Circuit-year has a higher fraction of female Republicans assigned, the precedent
that year will be that much more pro-defendant. We are interested in the subsequent effects of that
precedent on employer and employee outcomes. We are able to do so because the identity of a judge
on a case does not directly affect outcomes except through the precedent.30 It is also worth noting
that for our legal domain, pro-plaintiff vs. pro-defendant is the materially relevant legal doctrine.
A very interesting feature of the institutional setting, however, is that it is possible to assess this
hypothesis in conjunction with another. If there are other aspects of sexual harassment doctrine that
are sensitive to judges’ biographical characteristics, and if these other aspects of sexual harassment
doctrine affect economic outcomes, we should observe correlations between 2SLS residuals and
Circuit-year biographical characteristics not used in the first stage. They are not, which suggests
that either the pro-plaintiff vs. pro-defendant dimension of these sexual harassment cases is the
primary channel through which sexual harassment jurisprudence has an effect, or other aspects of
sexual harassment jurisprudence are not polarized along judicial demographic characteristics, which
reduces the concerns that we are picking up something other than pro-plaintiff vs. pro-defendant.31
Including lags that are important predictors of the outcome improves statistical precision. How-
ever, litigants’ decisions to appeal may respond to previous years’ legal decisions, so controlling for
1[Mct > 0] may bias the coefficient for Lawct; and the bias is more severe for more distant lags while
30The court decision is taken as precedent by subsequent courts. Also, judge identity do not predict stock prices
at the time of resolution controlling for the manner in which the case was resolved and judge identity do not predict
stock prices at the moment that judges are revealed (Badawi and Chen 2014).
31Moreover, each Circuit Court decides many thousands of cases per year. The effects we observe are not likely to
reflect the effects of other decisions made by other judges as the composition of judicial panels in other legal areas
should be uncorrelated. The identity of the judge plausibly affects economic outcomes through the legal precedent
alone.
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being non-existent for the most advanced lead. We assess whether this potential endogeneity is a
significant concern. We describe our instrumental variables strategy for 1[Mct > 0], which relies on
the composition of District Court judges assigned to sexual harassment cases. We considered two
identification strategies and implemented the first one due to data availability.
In the first strategy, wct =
∑J
d=1
Kcdt∗
(
Lcdt
Kcdt
)
∑J
d=1
Kcdt
, where Kcdt denotes the number of cases filed in
District court d within Circuit c at time t.32 Lcdt denotes the number of judges with a particular
characteristic assigned to cases. The intuition is that assigning District judges who are dispropor-
tionately appealed, for whatever reason, leads to the presence of a case in the Circuit, 1[Mct > 0].
Note that the terms in the numerator need Kcdt > 0. An approximation is to define Kcdt ∗
(
Lcdt
Kcdt
)
as 0 if Kcdt = 0. Then, the instrument can be constructed if
∑J
d=1Kcdt > 0, i.e., the denominator
is non-zero.
In the second definition, w˜ct =
∑J˜
d˜=1
K
cd˜t
∗
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
− E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
))
, where d˜ denotes District court-
house or court.33 A District Court has several courthouses (also referred to as Divisions) and in
some District Courts, random assignment is at the courthouse level. The second definition does not
rely on the exogeneity of the location of next sexual harassment case, K
cd˜t
. It also does not rely on
K
cd˜t
> 0, though it still relies on
∑J˜
d˜=1
K
cd˜t
> 0, i.e., a non-missing value for each Circuit c time t.34
It is not possible to merge courthouse location for most of the District Court cases.35 This results
in w˜ct being undefined in over 50% of Circuit-years and thus requiring another dummying out for
missing strategy.36 We opted to use wct. We restrict our attention to cases authored by District
Court judges and exclude recommendations by magistrate judges because litigants cannot directly
32J goes from 5 to 13 depending on the District.
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Fact The Law of Iterated Expectations (LIE) implies E
(
K
cd˜t
∗
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
− E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
))
∗ ct
)
= 0.
Proof Using LIE, E
(
K
cd˜t
∗
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
− E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
))
∗ ct
)
= E
(
E
[
K
cd˜t
∗
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
− E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
))
∗ ct
∣∣∣Kcd˜t]).
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35We tried to link the courthouse information from the AOC via the docket number.
36When we use w˜ct, we include a dummy for missing values in w˜ct and define w˜ct to be 0 when it would otherwise
be missing.
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appeal a magistrate judge’s recommendation (28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)).37
We find that the coefficients for Lawct are very similar, so we do not focus our analysis on District
Court cases. It would seem to suggest that the willingness to appeal was not significantly affected by
prior years’ assignment of Circuit judges to sexual harassment cases, at least in a manner that would
lead to significant changes in our estimates of the effect of Lawct. In Section 6, we present empirical
assessments of randomization and potential issues that arise because our data comprise published
opinions: settlement, publication, and strategic use of keywords or citation. Theoretically, settlement
is not an issue: judges are revealed after litigants file their briefs in Circuit Courts, sometimes only
a few days before the hearing, which gives little opportunity and incentive for settlement upon
learning the identity of the panel.38 Second, unpublished cases do not have precedential authority.39
Third, we collected additional data to examine how similar the string of actual panel assignments
is to a random string.40
3 The Effect of Judge Identity on Court Decisions
Judges vote more along party lines than along gender lines (Dixon 2010), and presidents who
appoint nontraditional (e.g., women) candidates take the opportunity to appoint more ideologi-
cally extreme individuals (Asmussen 2011). Female conservatives exhibit prejudice against females
(Eisenman 1991), and female Republicans were 18 percentage points less likely to vote pro-plaintiff
(p < 0.05). This estimate is reported in Table II Panel A Column 4. Male Democrats were 13 per-
centage points more likely to vote pro-plaintiff (p < 0.01) as can be seen in Column 5. Democrats
were also 13 percentage points more likely to vote in favor of sexual harassment plaintiffs (p < 0.01)
in Column 2. Because female Republicans were more conservative than female Democrats were lib-
eral, female judges on net were 3 percentage points less likely to vote in favor of sexual harassment
37We also tested the following sensitivity check. With many endogenous variables and many instruments, there
is a danger of overfitting with instruments from the wrong year. In robustness checks, we use the contemporaneous
instruments to predict Lawc(t) and 1[Mct > 0] and use the fitted values as instrumental variables in 2SLS.
To see how, suppose:
Y ict = β10Lawc(t) + β11Lawc(t−1) + ...+ εict
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38Notably, settlement rates were unaffected by the D.C. Circuit announcing their judges earlier (Jordan 2007).
39Unpublished cases are routine cases. Judicial ideology has no impact on unpublished cases (Keele et al. 2009)
nor the decision to publish (Merritt and Brudney 2001).
40To see the random strings test assessed in Chen (2013) as an omnibus test: Suppose female Republicans are more
likely to publish cases or use the keywords that generate our sample, then we should expect female Republicans to
appear autocorrelated relative to a set of simulated strings.
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plaintiffs (p > 0.1, Column 1) and were 8 percentage points less likely to vote pro-plaintiff when also
controlling for party of appointment (p < 0.1, Column 3). We use male Democrat as our instrumen-
tal variable to mirror female Republican as instrumental variable. The point estimates change little
when both are included (Column 6) and are essentially unaffected with the inclusion of Circuit and
year fixed effects in Column 7, the inclusion of the expected number of male Democrats per seat
and the expected number of female Republicans per seat in Column 8, and both sets of controls in
Column 9.
In Panel B, we examine the verdict at the case-level. An additional female Republican on a
three-judge panel reduced the chances of a pro-plaintiff decision by 18 percentage points (p < 0.05)
in Panel B Column 1.41 An additional male Democrat on a three-judge panel increased the chances
of a pro-plaintiff decision by 11 percentage points (p < 0.01) in Column 2, magnitudes that are
similar to the judge-level votes. The point estimates and statistical significance change little with
the inclusion of both variables (Column 3), fixed effects (Column 4), the expected judge type per
seat (Column 5), and both sets of controls (Column 6).
In Panel C, we examine these relationships at the Circuit-year level for the 124 Circuit-years
with at least 1 case in Columns 1 to 3. The estimates indicate that an additional female Republican
on a three-judge panel decreased the proportion of pro-plaintiff decisions by 34 percentage points
in Column 1 (p < 0.01) and an additional male Democrat on a three-judge panel increased the
proportion of pro-plaintiff decisions by 17 percentage points in Column 2 (p < 0.01). The coefficient
at the Circuit-year level can be different from the coefficient at the case level due to the fact that
cases can bunch up unevenly across Circuit-years. Column 4 adds a dummy indicator for whether
there were cases, 1 [Mct > 0] and dummies out for missing values.42 The number of observations
increases to the complete time-frame of 252 Circuit-years.43 The point estimates and F-statistics
are completely unaffected by dummying out for missing values, which indicates that the increase
in sample size from dummying out for missing values is not driving results.44 The point estimates
remain similar with the inclusion of both variables (Column 6), fixed effects (Column 7), the expected
41Female Republicans per seat varies from 0 to 1, so we divide the coefficient by 3.
42Dummying out for missing values is a standard approach in the literature. We redefine Lawct = Lawct ∗
1 [Mct−n > 0], i.e., defined to be 0 when 1 [Mct−n > 0] = 0, and regress it onto the instrument pct = NctMct ∗
1 [Mct−n > 0], while including 1 [Mct−n > 0] as a control.
43Circuit 11 was not founded until 1981, so Circuit 11 has 6 fewer observations than the other Circuits. Circuit 11
was created by splitting it off from Circuit 5; Circuit 5’s decisions before this split are considered binding precedent
in Circuit 11. We account for this split in our analyses by assigning pre-1981 precedent in Circuit 5 to observations
in Circuit 11.
44The R-square mechanically increases, but the F-statistic for strength of first stage does not.
26
TABLE II
First Stage: Relationship Between Pro-Plaintiff Sexual Harassment Courts of Appeals Decisions
and Composition of Sexual Harassment Panels, 1982-2002
Panel A: Judge Level Outcome: Pro-plaintiff Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Female -0.0332 -0.0785+
(0.0394) (0.0416)
Democrat 0.131** 0.143**
(0.0358) (0.0371)
Female Republican -0.183* -0.145+ -0.122+ -0.112+ -0.117
(0.0757) (0.0739) (0.0616) (0.0612) (0.0659)
Male Democrat 0.130** 0.121** 0.110** 0.122** 0.111*
(0.0361) (0.0362) (0.0353) (0.0377) (0.0373)
Circuit-year controls N N N N N N Fixed Effects Expectations Both
F-statistic 0.71 13.48 7.81 5.87 12.89 7.88 6.06 6.45 5.02
N 752 752 752 752 752 752 752 752 752
R-sq 0.001 0.018 0.021 0.006 0.016 0.019 0.112 0.026 0.112
Panel B: Case Level Outcome: Pro-Plaintiff Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Republicans -0.553* -0.434+ -0.418+ -0.379+ -0.407
per Seat (0.200) (0.217) (0.211) (0.208) (0.234)
Male Democrats 0.322** 0.286* 0.285* 0.314** 0.298*
per Seat (0.0876) (0.0933) (0.103) (0.0967) (0.110)
Circuit-year controls N N N Fixed Effects Expectations Both
F-statistic of instruments 7.66 13.48 7.91 6.17 7.33 4.61
N 251 251 251 251 251 251
R-sq 0.019 0.032 0.043 0.126 0.046 0.128
Panel C: Circuit-Year Level Outcome: Proportion of Pro-Plaintiff Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Female Republicans -1.015** -0.848** -1.015** -0.848** -0.810** -0.804** -0.845**
per Seat (0.224) (0.256) (0.224) (0.256) (0.217) (0.221) (0.199)
Male Democrats 0.513** 0.445* 0.513** 0.445* 0.459* 0.455* 0.494**
per Seat (0.164) (0.165) (0.164) (0.165) (0.150) (0.155) (0.145)
Circuit-years with no cases Dropped Dropped Dropped Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied
Circuit-year controls N N N N N N Fixed Effects FE, Expect FE, Trends
F-statistic of instruments 20.53 9.84 22.46 20.53 9.84 22.56 63.92 41.23 32.95
N 124 124 124 252 252 252 252 252 252
R-sq 0.067 0.080 0.125 0.605 0.611 0.630 0.669 0.669 0.706
Panel D: Analysis Level Outcome: Proportion of Pro-Plaintiff Decisions
Firm HR Policies (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female Republicans -1.284* -0.874 -0.871 -0.593 -0.600 -0.528
per Seat (0.568) (0.508) (0.510) (0.428) (0.409) (0.436)
Male Democrats 0.663** 0.535** 0.534** 0.509** 0.523** 0.479**
per Seat (0.174) (0.130) (0.131) (0.0990) (0.0943) (0.102)
Circuit-years with no cases Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied
Firm-level controls N N N Y Y Y Y
Circuit-year controls N N N N Fixed Effects FE, Expect FE, Trends
F-statistic of instruments 5.12 14.52 10.30 10.15 13.95 16.01 11.09
N 5584 5584 5584 5584 5584 5584 5584
R-sq 0.647 0.663 0.679 0.680 0.733 0.735 0.751
Panel D: Analysis Level Outcome: Proportion of Pro-Plaintiff Decisions
Individual MORG CPS (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Female Republicans -1.163** -0.973** -0.971** -0.839** -0.849** -0.767**
per Seat (0.284) (0.283) (0.281) (0.167) (0.174) (0.182)
Male Democrats 0.524** 0.441* 0.442* 0.467** 0.466** 0.517**
per Seat (0.157) (0.151) (0.151) (0.147) (0.152) (0.155)
Circuit-years with no cases Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied
Individual-level controls N N N Y Y Y Y
Circuit-year controls N N N N Fixed Effects FE, Expect FE, Trends
F-statistic of instruments 16.77 11.22 16.96 17.11 50.31 32.32 38.12
N 5429470 5429470 5429470 5418564 5418564 5418564 5418564
R-sq 0.627 0.628 0.652 0.652 0.691 0.691 0.711
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Observations
are clustered at the Circuit level. Fixed effects are dummy indicators for Circuit and for year. Expectations are the
expected number of Female Republicans and Male Democrats per seat. Trends are Circuit-specific time trends. In
Panels C and D, proportions of pro-plaintiff decisions and judicial type per seat during Circuit-years with no cases
are defind to be 0.
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judge type per seat (Column 8), and Circuit-specific time trends (Column 9).
The F-statistic is 21 for the female Republican instrument and 9.8 for the male Democrat instru-
ment. When both are included, the joint F is 22.5, which is above the weak instruments threshold.
The addition of fixed effects, expectations, and Circuit-specific time trends increases the F-statistic
on the instruments up to 63.9. The R-square does not change much with the inclusion of controls
in Columns 7-9 and does not change at all when expectations (Column 8) are added on top of the
fixed effects (Column 7).
Panels D reports the first stage analyzed at the level of our firm-level analysis.45 The coefficients
differ from those in Panel C because the numbers of firms per Circuit-year is not constant. The
F-statistic is 10 in Column 3 and increases up to 16 with the inclusion of firm-level controls, fixed
effects, and additional Circuit-year controls. Panel E reports the first stage analyzed at the level
of our individual-level analysis. The point estimates are more similar to those in Panel C. The
F-statistic is 17 in Column 3 and goes up to 50 with the additional controls.
To check whether our linear specifications miss important aspects of the data, Figures 5A and
5B present nonparametric local polynomial estimates of the first stage.46 The first stage effect is
not due to outliers. The results show a monotonically increasing relationship for male Democrats
and decreasing one for female Republicans.
Table III presents a falsification test of the instrument and shows that the proportion of pro-
plaintiff decisions is not related to the number of male Democrats per seat or the number of female
Republicans per seat in the one or two years before and after the true instrument. Typically, Circuit
Courts handle cases that present new legal issues, so we should not expect future proportions of
pro-plaintiff decisions to respond to past assignment of treatment.
This last finding does not mean that Circuit Court cases have no precedent.47 Rather, this
finding is consistent with only the hardest, most novel legal issues being decided in Circuit Courts.
This institutional setting means that
∑∞
n=0 β1n =
∑∞
n=0 TOT
n
ct =
∑∞
n=0 LATE
n
ct. In the LATE
setting, compliers are cases that respond to assignment of the judge. These are the cases with
enough legal ambiguity such that differences in perspective yield different decisions. Some cases
45Bertrand et al. (2004) recommend an analysis at the individual level to be able to control for individual-level
covariates.
46Estimation proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we regress the proportion of decisions that were progressive
on Circuit and year fixed effects and we regress the instrument on the same. Next, we take the residuals from these
two regressions and use a nonparametric local polynomial estimator to characterize the relationship between the
instrument and progressive decisions.
47Chen et al. (2014a) examines cases filed before the Circuit Court decision but resolved after the Circuit decision
and finds that lower court judges follow legal precedent.
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have no strong legal precedent. In these cases, judges seek guidance (Posner 1998; Breyer 2006;
Abramowicz et al. 2011). Always-takers and never-takers are cases without ambiguity.48 These are
the easy cases that do not respond to the assignment of the judge because of strong precedent.
Then recall: TOT ≡ E[Y1i − Y0i|Ri = 1] = E[Y1i − Y0i|R1i > R0i]Pr(R1i > R0i|Ri = 1) +
E[Y1i − Y0i|Ri = 1]Pr(R1i = R0i = 1|Ri = 1), where Ri indicates whether i received treatment,
R1i > R0i indicates whether individual i is a complier and R1i = R0i = 1 denotes an always-
taker, under the assumption of no defiers. The strong first stage suggests that any bias that results
from the presence of non-compliers is likely to be small. The bias from non-monotonicity is given
by Pr[Defier]Pr[Complier]−Pr[Defier](β
Complier − βDefier), which is likely to be small even if there are non-
compliers, since the magnitude of the first stage is large (the denominator grows and the numerator
shrinks) using biographical characteristics as the instrument.
We also employed LASSO to instrument for Lawct. It is worth noting that a large number of
biographical characteristics serve as valid instruments, which results in a weak instruments problem
if we used them all.49 Our approach has the benefit of a surfeit of experimental variation. The
statistician must trade-off, however, between the power of the first stage regression with the addition
of instruments (Angrist and Imbens 1995; Stock and Yogo 2005). Choosing among a large number
of instruments quickly becomes a challenging statistical issue. We use LASSO (Least Absolute
Shrinkage and Selection Operator) to address the issue of instrument selection (Belloni et al. 2012).
LASSO addresses a problem with OLS, which has low bias but large variance: change the data
a bit, and you get different subsets of covariates deemed important. LASSO is a sparse model
that automatically sets small estimated coefficients to 0 to reduce model complexity. As such,
LASSO is an effective tool in selecting instrumental variables from available judicial biographical
characteristics. Since using too many instruments effectively renders the instruments weak, such a
selection device is necessary. LASSO minimizes the sum of squares subject to the sum of the absolute
value of the coefficients being less than a constant. Because of the nature of this constraint, it tends
to produce some coefficients that are exactly 0 and hence gives interpretable models. Intuitively, it
48Ambiguity causes polarization in perceptions (Baliga et al. 2013).
49The thirty characteristics are: Democrat, male, male Democrat, female Republican, non-White, Black, Jewish,
Catholic, No religion, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, BA received from same state of appointment, BA from a
public institution, JD from a public institution, having an LLM or SJD, elevated from District Court, born in the
1910s, 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, appointed when president and congress majority were from the same party, ABA
score, above median wealth, appointed by president from an opposing party, prior federal judiciary experience, prior
law professor, prior government experience, previous assistant U.S. attorney, and previous U.S. attorney. Adding
panel-level interactions (e.g., fraction of judge seats assigned to Democrats multiplied by fraction of judge seats
assigned to Blacks) yielded a total of 450 possible instruments.
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TABLE III
Falsification Test of Instrument: Relationship Between Pro-Plaintiff Sexual Harassment Courts
of Appeals Decisions and Composition of Sexual Harassment Panels in Other Years, 1982-2002
Circuit-Year Level Outcome: Proportion of Pro-Plaintiff Decisionst
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Republicans -0.771* -0.888** -0.828** -0.714*
per Seatt (0.249) (0.226) (0.178) (0.249)
Male Democrats 0.442* 0.375* 0.433* 0.460**
per Seatt (0.146) (0.147) (0.154) (0.142)
Female Republicans -0.226 -0.292
per Seatt−1 (0.320) (0.374)
Male Democrats 0.0486 0.00643
per Seatt−1 (0.120) (0.107)
Female Republicans -0.0758
per Seatt−2 (0.263)
Male Democrats -0.0948
per Seatt−2 (0.181)
Female Republicans -0.301 -0.174
per Seatt+1 (0.173) (0.203)
Male Democrats -0.196 -0.0741
per Seatt+1 (0.134) (0.129)
Female Republicans -0.0118
per Seatt+2 (0.198)
Male Democrats 0.127
per Seatt+2 (0.113)
Circuit-years with no cases Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied
Circuit-year controls Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
N 240 228 240 228
R-sq 0.660 0.665 0.702 0.713
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Observations
are clustered at the Circuit level. Fixed effects are dummy indicators for Circuit and for year. Proportions of
pro-plaintiff decisions and judicial type per seat during Circuit-years with no cases are defind to be 0.
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is a data penalty for having too many covariates. Additional covariates, whose coefficients are not
0, are more likely to violate that constraint. We have a very large number of valid instruments,
but not every demographic characteristic matters. LASSO enhances statistical precision when using
the random assignment of Circuit and District Court judges. LASSO is theoretically optimal under
certain conditions including sparsity described by Belloni et al. (2012). The use of the LASSO-
selected instruments also provides a check of over-identification.
The joint F statistic increases to 33 for the Circuit-year level and up to 130 for the analysis-
level.50 The results are unaffected by the inclusion of instruments for 1[Mct > 0]. It is worth
repeating that including the effects of 1[Mct > 0] renders additional counterfactuals of interest. The
focus of the paper is on the difference between pro-plaintiff vs. pro-defendant precedent, but one
may also be interested in the difference between pro-plaintiff vs. no precedent. The U.S. Federal
Courts effectively randomize both the coin flip (pro-plaintiff vs. pro-defendant) and the presence of
the coin itself (pro-plaintiff vs. no decision vs. pro-defendant).51
4 Estimating the Impact of Sexual Harassment Law on Gender Inequality
4.1 Human Resources Policies We should expect to see an effect if the following three
assumptions are met: judges follow precedent; on the margin, pro-plaintiff decisions in Circuit Courts
make it easier for subsequent sexual harassment plaintiffs to bring and win suits (see the appendix
for a list of major doctrinal developments shifting the legal landscape under which plaintiffs may
win); and firms respond to Circuit decisions. While the first two assumptions are less contested, the
third bears further examination.
Table IV displays the effect of pro-plaintiff sexual harassment jurisprudence on the adoption of
sexual harassment human resources policies. Firms were 5.7 percentage points more likely to have
a sexual harassment policy on average in each year in the five years after a pro-plaintiff precedent
than after a pro-defendant precedent (the IV estimate is reported in Column 2 and the average lag
is reported at the bottom). The most statistically significant effects are found in the first three years
after the precedent. This can be seen in Figure 6A, which displays the 95% confidence intervals.
The lead effects are always insignificant. Similar findings are found with the LASSO instruments
50At the Circuit-year level, the LASSO procedure selected the following three instruments: the interaction between
the number of male Democrats per seat and the number of judges born in the 1920s per seat, the interaction between
the number of female Republican per seat and the number of judges having an LLM or SJD per seat, and the
interaction between the number of female Republican per seat and the number of judges with above median wealth
per seat.
51A detailed analysis of assumptions behind these alternative conterfactuals and why they might be interesting is
presented elsewhere (Chen et al. 2014b; Chen and Yeh 2014b).
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TABLE IV
The Effect of Sexual Harassment Law on Human Resources Sexual Harassment Policy
Presence of Sexual Harassment Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00108 0.0374 0.0279 0.0353
Circuit Decisionst+1 (0.0142) (0.0252) (0.0233) (0.0354)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00984 0.0231 -0.0167 0.0282
Circuit Decisionst (0.0135) (0.0316) (0.0443) (0.0291)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.0157 0.0408+ 0.0455* 0.0223
Circuit Decisionst−1 (0.0215) (0.0244) (0.0224) (0.0687)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.0291 0.0210 0.0978+ -0.0102
Circuit Decisionst−2 (0.0188) (0.0507) (0.0503) (0.0542)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.0616** 0.117** 0.0612 0.112*
Circuit Decisionst−3 (0.0153) (0.0405) (0.0413) (0.0510)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.0494* 0.0542 -0.00609 0.146**
Circuit Decisionst−4 (0.0162) (0.0545) (0.0497) (0.0502)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00874 0.0517 0.0533+ 0.103
Circuit Decisionst−5 (0.0154) (0.0439) (0.0290) (0.0677)
Controls Y Y Y Y
IV N Y Lasso IV Lasso IV, District IV
Mean dependant variable 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.646
Average lag 0.029 0.057 0.050 0.075
Joint F lags 9.34 24.09 30.20 13.70
Joint F leads 0.01 2.20 1.44 1.44
N 4014 4014 4014 2617
R-sq 0.260 0.259 0.257 0.121
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Observations
are clustered at the Circuit level. These regressions include firm-related controls (number of employees, percent of
women at location, sex of top executive named, percent women among named executives, age of establishment,
dummies for manufacturing, service, and trucking, regional unemployment rate, and percent female in industry),
Circuit fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, Circuit-specific time trends, and a dummy for whether there were no cases in
that Circuit-year. The regressions also include all the lags of the dummy for there being no cases, sexual harassment
law, and the instruments as well as the interactions of these variables with gender.
(Column 3) and when both the LASSO and District-level instruments are used (Column 4).52
From 1982 to 1997, an average of 54% of establishments reported having sexual harassment
policies, growing from 15% in 1982 to 96% in 1997. Our baseline point estimate of 5.7 percentage
points means that, after taking into account how often there is a case and in which direction a case is
typically resolved (half of the Circuit-years had a case and two-thirds of the cases were pro-plaintiff
while one-third were pro-defendant), then the impact of sexual harassment law is equivalent to 37%
of the yearly increase.
To understand this calculation in more detail, since the typical Circuit-year had sexual harassment
panels half of the time and 0.67 proportion of decisions were pro-plaintiff (Table I), multiplying 0.67,
52These results are robust to collapsing the data to Circuit-year means and using LASSO and District-level instru-
ments.
32
0.5, and 5.7 percentage points suggests that, since the genesis of sexual harassment law, its average
impact in a typical Circuit-year caused firms to be 1.9 percentage points more likely to have a sexual
harassment policy. Assuming a linear 81 percentage point increase in sexual harassment policy during
the 16 years, firms were 5.1 percentage points more likely to have a sexual harassment policy in any
given Circuit-year. Under these assumptions, pro-plaintiff sexual harassment law appears to have
played an important role in the change of human resources policies to address sexual harassment,
equivalent to 37% of the yearly change. This back-of-the-envelope calculation is subject to the
usual caveats that causal effects are sufficient, but not necessary conditions for an outcome (Deaton
2010).53
What we have reported in Table IV are estimates that condition on the presence of a Circuit case,
that is, we identify the causal effect of a pro-plaintiff decision where the counterfactual is a pro-
defendant decision. To examine the unconditional effect (where the counterfactual is no decision),
i.e., what if sexual harassment law had never existed in the courts whatsoever, we need to consider
the average coefficient on the presence of a Circuit case, which is -0.043 for Column 2, -0.038 for
Column 3, and -0.027 for Column 4 (not displayed). We focus on Column 4, which uses the random
assignment of District judges to construct another set of instruments to isolate a component of the
effect of having a Circuit case that is uncorrelated with other social trends and legal developments.
Here, a pro-plaintiff precedent increased by 0.075 - 0.027 or 4.8 percentage points the likelihood
of having a sexual harassment human resources policy while a pro-defendant precedent decreased
by 2.7 percentage points the likelihood of having a sexual harassment human resources policy.
This inference is possible because the identification of presence of a case captures the effect of
pro-defendant precedent where the counterfactual is no case, whereas, adding the coefficients on
pro-plaintiff precedent and on presence of a case yields the effect of pro-plaintiff precedent where
the counterfactual is no case. We will refer to the latter as the unconditional effect.
The joint F statistic on the coefficient on the presence of appeals is 9.2. Similar back-of-the-
envelope calculations imply that the impact of sexual harassment Circuit decisions from a typical
Circuit-year is equivalent to 24% of the annual change in human resources policies addressing sexual
harassment. In more detail, since 67% of decisions were pro-plaintiff, but only half the Circuit-years
saw a Circuit sexual harassment case, we multiply 0.67, 0.50 and 4.8 to obtain a 1.6 percentage
point increase in sexual harassment human resources policy due to pro-plaintiff decisions in a typical
53To illustrate, Chen et al. (2016e) use a machine learning approach to analyze the effects of court laws and finds
that, of 18 factors that predict abortion attitudes, the court variables comprise 25-30% of the sixth factor.
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Circuit-year and multiply 0.33, 0.50, and 2.7 to obtain a 0.4 percentage point decrease in sexual
harassment human resources policy due to pro-defendant decisions in a typical Circuit-year. The
net effect is 1.6 - 0.4, or 1.2 percentage points out of 5.1 percentage points annual increase in sexual
harassment human resources policies.
4.2 Labor Force Participation Table V presents the results on labor market outcomes. The
odd-numbered columns report OLS estimates while the even-numbered columns report 2SLS. The
average interaction lag and the average level effect lag are reported at the bottom. On average, a
pro-plaintiff sexual harassment Courts of Appeals decision increased female employment relative to
males by 1.6 percentage points in the likelihood of working part-time or full-time in the five years
after the decision (Column 2). The level effect reveals that a pro-plaintiff sexual harassment decision
reduced the likelihood that males were working part-time or full-time by 1.3 percentage points per
year during the five years after the decision. The strongest effects were in the fifth year after the
decision, a few years after the strongest effects for sexual harassment human resource policies. Figure
6B plots the coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals. The lags are jointly significant and none
of the lead coefficients are statistically significant.
Table VI presents a number of robustness checks on the labor force participation results. Averages
of the interaction lags are displayed in Column 1 and joint F tests of the lags are displayed in Column
2. We see that the point estimates and statistical significance of the 2SLS estimates hardly change
when we add Circuit specific time trends (row A), remove Circuit and year fixed effects (row B),
remove all control variables except gender, presence of Circuit cases, and interaction of gender with
presence of a Circuit case (row C), control for the expected number of male Democrats per seat and
the expected number of female Republicans per seat (row D), or add state fixed effects (row E). The
robustness to these model perturbations is consistent with the first stage estimates being invariant
to the inclusion or exclusion of these controls in Table II. The joint F test increases significantly
to 16.49 when we do not use CPS weights (row F). The average interaction lag increases from 1.6
percentage points to 2.1 percentage points and has a joint F test of 19.25 when we add a two-year
lead (row G); the joint F statistics on the leads are still insignificant. The estimates also change little
when we drop one Circuit at a time, though the joint significance varies (row H). Results are similar
when we cluster standard errors at the state level (row I), collapse the data to the Circuit-year level
(row J), use LASSO IV (row J), and use District IV (row L).
The point estimates are very stable, which is consistent with the use of randomization to estimate
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TABLE V
The Effect of Sexual Harassment Law on Gender Inequality
Employment Status Hours Worked Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.000709 0.00549 0.0690 0.527 0.00981 0.0717
Circuit Decisionst+1 (0.00308) (0.00876) (0.147) (0.466) (0.0251) (0.0549)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00208 0.00163 -0.152 -0.360 -0.00837 -0.0248
Circuit Decisionst+1 * Female (0.00454) (0.0127) (0.136) (0.595) (0.0285) (0.0667)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00119 0.00336 0.0655 0.147 0.000603 0.0366
Circuit Decisionst (0.00300) (0.00718) (0.149) (0.334) (0.0217) (0.0424)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00207 -0.00309 -0.188 -0.552 -0.0000162 -0.0398
Circuit Decisionst * Female (0.00527) (0.00891) (0.196) (0.438) (0.0284) (0.0532)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00483 -0.00609 -0.170 -0.300 -0.0234 -0.0166
Circuit Decisionst−1 (0.00361) (0.00694) (0.152) (0.405) (0.0248) (0.0424)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00701 0.00798 0.135 0.105 0.0378 0.0176
Circuit Decisionst−1 * Female (0.00685) (0.00964) (0.245) (0.373) (0.0382) (0.0501)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00649 -0.0117 -0.303 -0.739 -0.0456 -0.0912
Circuit Decisionst−2 (0.00367) (0.0135) (0.176) (0.681) (0.0265) (0.0967)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00631 0.00353 0.258 0.539 0.0490 0.0653
Circuit Decisionst−2 * Female (0.00509) (0.0170) (0.216) (0.868) (0.0293) (0.113)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00657 -0.0147 -0.293 -0.273 -0.0520 -0.0992
Circuit Decisionst−3 (0.00440) (0.0106) (0.209) (0.604) (0.0322) (0.0902)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00476 0.0182 0.214 0.522 0.0506 0.142
Circuit Decisionst−3 * Female (0.00613) (0.0140) (0.278) (0.646) (0.0397) (0.109)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00726 -0.00640 -0.202 -0.117 -0.0463 -0.0552
Circuit Decisionst−4 (0.00487) (0.00513) (0.216) (0.259) (0.0344) (0.0500)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00771 0.00195 0.124 -0.156 0.0559 0.0466
Circuit Decisionst−4 * Female (0.00721) (0.00887) (0.229) (0.354) (0.0423) (0.0632)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00694+ -0.0284** -0.133 -0.723+ -0.0460 -0.166*
Circuit Decisionst−5 (0.00373) (0.0105) (0.164) (0.427) (0.0306) (0.0689)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00803 0.0476* 0.249 1.531+ 0.0615 0.293**
Circuit Decisionst−5 * Female (0.00626) (0.0187) (0.210) (0.799) (0.0369) (0.113)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
IV N Y N Y N Y
Mean dependant variable - Male 0.813 0.813 34.33 34.33 4.910 4.910
Mean dependant variable - Female 0.646 0.646 22.78 22.78 3.654 3.654
Average interaction lag 0.007 0.016 0.196 0.508 0.051 0.113
Average level effect lag -0.006 -0.013 -0.220 -0.430 -0.043 -0.086
Joint F of interaction lags 8.53 5.42 7.60
Joint F of interaction leads 0.02 0.37 0.14
Joint F of level effect lags 28.11 5.07 10.86
Joint F of level effect leads 0.39 1.28 1.70
N 3736671 3736671 3608012 3608012 3410738 3410738
R-sq 0.095 0.095 0.131 0.131 0.133 0.133
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. All regressions use MORG CPS and restrict to individuals between the
ages of 18 and 65. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Observations are clustered at the
Circuit level. Hours and Log earnings set to 0 for individuals not employed. All estimates are weighted using CPS
survey weights. These regressions include individual controls (age, race dummies, educational attainment dummies,
and marital status dummy), Circuit fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, a dummy for whether there were no cases in
that Circuit-year. The regressions also include interactions between the female indicator and the dummy for there
being no cases, sexual harassment law, and the instruments.
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TABLE VI
Robustness of IV Estimates
The Effect of Sexual Harassment Law on Female Employment Share
Average of interaction lags Joint F of interaction lags
(1) (2)
A. Add Circuit-Specific Trends 0.016 8.35
B. No Fixed Effects 0.016 8.17
C. No Control Variables (except Presence of Circuit 0.017 8.08
Case, Presence Interacted with Gender, and Gender)
D. Control for Expectation 0.016 8.31
E. Add State Fixed Effects 0.016 8.00
F. No CPS Weights 0.013 16.49
G. Add 2-year Lead 0.021 19.25
H. Drop 1 Circuit
Circuit 1 0.015 6.57
Circuit 2 0.017 14.22
Circuit 3 0.016 13.81
Circuit 4 0.017 17.12
Circuit 5 0.007 37.15
Circuit 6 0.017 6.61
Circuit 7 0.017 8.72
Circuit 8 0.013 6.33
Circuit 9 0.019 5.13
Circuit 10 0.018 34.03
Circuit 11 0.014 17.23
Circuit 12 0.016 8.76
I. Cluster at State Level 0.016 11.88
J. Collapsed to Circuit-Year level 0.017 14.64
K. Collapsed with Lasso IV 0.011 25.47
L. Collapsed with Lasso and District IV 0.013 9.40
causal effects. We can also employ Monte Carlo placebo simulations that randomly assign the laws
and panel assignments to different Circuits. The most conservative simulation assigns the complete
time series of legal variation for one Circuit to another Circuit (Shoag 2011). The point estimate
for the collapsed Circuit-year data is at the 90th percentile in these simulations. Moreover, the use
of alternative instruments do not affect the results as we saw in Table IV.
We can compare these estimates with the estimates of the impact of other anti-discrimination
laws. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) increased black employment
shares by 0.5 to 1.1 points per year (Chay 1998). To understand what the conditional effect of
1.6 percentage points means in terms of its economic significance, multiplying by 0.67, the typical
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proportion of pro-plaintiff decisions, and 0.5, the proportion of Circuit-years with a Circuit sexual
harassment case, suggests that women were 0.55 percentage points more likely to have any employ-
ment as compared to men in the typical Circuit-year due to the development of sexual harassment
law during this time period. Across all Circuits and years, 81% of men were employed and 65%
of women were employed on average. Between 1982 and 2002, the percentage of men with full or
any employment stayed relatively constant from 78.8% to 80.5%, but for women, it increased dra-
matically from 56.7% to 68.6%, or about 0.57 percentage points per year. Since our specification
comes from a five-year lag distribution, this suggests that judicial sexual harassment decisions in
the previous five years caused 2.75 percentage points impact on gender inequality in employment.
Examining the impact on female employment alone, we would add the average level effect lag with
the average interaction lag, which results in 0.3 percentage points. The joint F significance of statis-
tical significance is 12.70. Multiplying by 0.67, 0.5, and 5 suggests that Circuit decisions regarding
sexual harassment cases in a typical five-year time period caused 0.5 percentage points increase in
female employment status, a small but economically significant amount.
Next, to compare with the EEOA, we would need to add the effect of a presence of a Circuit case
with the effect of a pro-plaintiff decision. To calculate the unconditional effect of sexual harassment
precedent taking into account the effect of the presence of a Circuit case, we use the District IV
estimates from row L. The average effect of a pro-plaintiff decision on female employment shares is
0.013. The average coefficient on the dummy indicator for the interaction of gender and presence
of a Circuit case is -0.009. The unconditional effect of a pro-plaintiff decision is to decrease female
employment shares by 0.4 percentage points. Multiplying 1.3 by 0.67 and 0.5, the proportion of
pro-plaintiff decisions and the frequency with which a Circuit case is present, indicates that the
conditional effects of pro-plaintiff sexual harassment decisions are on the lower range (0.44) of the
effects of EEOA found by Chay (1998); but multiplying 0.4 by those factors indicates that the
unconditional effects are one-third of those effects (0.13), or one-quarter of the effects of EEOA.
Multiplying by 5 to consider the effect of sexual harassment decisions in a typical five-year time
period indicates that sexual harassment law increased female employment shares by 0.67 to 2.1
points per year, suggesting an effect similar to those of EEOA.
4.3 Hours Worked Table V Columns 3 and 4 display the results on hours worked. One pro-
plaintiff sexual harassment Courts of Appeals decision increased female hours worked relative to
males by 30 minutes worked per week on average in each year during the five years after the
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decision (Column 4). It also reduced hours worked by males by 26 minutes per week on average in
each year during the five years after the decision. The strongest effects are again found in the fifth
year after the decision. The joint F of statistical significance is 5.42 on the lag interaction effects
and 5.07 on the lag level effects. None of the lead coefficients are statistically significant.
Between 1982 and 2002, gender gap in work hours closed by roughly 16 minutes/week per year,
so to understand what 0.51 hours worked means in terms of its economic significance, multiplying
by 0.67, the typical proportion of pro-plaintiff decisions, suggests that women were working 0.34
more hours per week compared to men in the typical Circuit-year due to the development of sexual
harassment law during this time period. Across all Circuits and years, men worked 34.33 hours per
week and women worked 22.78 hours per week. These averages are low because we define hours
worked to be 0 if an individual is not employed or in the labor force. In Section 5 we restrict our
attention to labor force participants and do not make this imputation. Between 1982 and 2002, the
male hours worked per week rose from 32.8 to 33.7 while female hours worked increased from 19.0
to 24.6, or about 0.26 hours worked per week per year. One can also calculate the effects of sexual
harassment law conditional on the presence of a case and, in its totality, including the presence of
a case, in which the effects are scaled down as in the previous sections.
4.4 Earnings Table V Column 6 reports the impact on the gender wage gap. Pro-plaintiff
sexual harassment precedent reduced the wage gap by 0.11 in log real weekly earnings on average
in each year during the five years after the decision. It reduced male wages by 0.09 log real weekly
earnings on average per year during the five years after the decision. The strongest effects are again
found in the fifth year after the decision. The joint F of statistical significance is 7.60 on the lag
interaction effects and 10.86 on the lag level effects. None of the lead coefficients are statistically
significant.54
Our analyses of wages and hours include both insiders and outsiders. We do this since the
insider-outsider theory of involuntary employment focuses on labor force participation in the entire
population. Analyses of wage gaps sometimes focus on insiders, i.e., the labor force participants who
report non-zero wages, and they report comparable effects. Focusing on insider wages, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act narrowed the black-white earnings gap by 0.11 to 0.18 log points per
year (Chay 1998) and state laws barring race discrimination increased black men’s relative earnings
by 0.28% per year (Neumark and Stock 2006). Including outsiders, a standard deviation increase in
54Between 1982 and 2002, the male log real weekly earnings rose from 4.75 to 4.95 while female log real weekly
earnings increased from 3.11 to 4.02, or about 0.033 decrease in gender wage gap per year.
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median male sexism in a state is associated with a 0.031 log point decrease in female wages relative
to males (Charles et al. 2010), so sexual harassment law is comparable to the effects of a standard
deviation in median male sexism.55
To see how our estimates compare with the estimates of the impact of male sexism, we can
calculate the unconditional effect of sexual harassment law. A pro-plaintiff decision increased female
wages relative to males by 0.11 log points but the presence of an appeal decreased female wages
relative to males by 0.05 log points. In other words, a pro-defendant decision had an unconditional
effect of decreasing female wages relative to males by 0.05 log points and a pro-plaintiff decision
had an unconditional effect of increasing female wages relative to males by 0.06. Multiplying by
0.67 and 0.5, the proportion of pro-plaintiff decisions and the frequency with which a Circuit case
is present, indicates that during the development of stricter sexual harassment law, a typical year
saw a 0.02 log points increase in female wages relative to males, roughly equivalent to two-thirds of
a standard deviation in median male sexism.
5 Evidence for the Insider-Outsider Theory of Involuntary Unemployment
5.1 Disaggregating the Effects of Sexual Harassment Law by Industry Sexual harass-
ment is very difficult to measure objectively.56 Changing social mores can also make it difficult
to measure whether a change in registered sexual harassment complaints is due to an increasing
willingness to report, increasing sensitivity to harassment, or increasing harassment. Therefore, we
cannot directly measure the impact of sexual harassment law on incidence of sexual harassment.57
We can, however, disaggregate the effects of sexual harassment law and evaluate its effects specifi-
cally in an industry with a reputedly high amount of sexual harassment–the construction industry.
Sexual harassment rates per 100,000 women were highest in the construction industry according to
complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Hersch 2011). The bulk of
sexual harassment plaintiffs (38%) are in the blue-collar industry (Juliano and Schwab 2000).
Table VII documents that the ameliorative effects on gender inequality are positive and statis-
tically significant for employment status, hours worked, and earnings in the construction industry
but negative for the other industries. Note that we restrict the analysis to workers who report an
55When analyses include outsiders, studies make different wage imputations about non-labor force participants.
Some studies of the gender wage gap correct for selection by imputing wages above or below the median based on
educational attainment for women not working full-time and then estimating median regressions (see, e.g., Neal 2004;
Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008; Charles et al. 2010).
56In a study using decoy crime victims, Banerjee et al. (2012) find that only 50% of sexual harassment cases are
registered by the police, in contrast to 92% of break-ins and more than 64% of motorcycle thefts.
57For example, the number of sexual harassment claims filed increased after the 1991 Clarence Thomas hearings.
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industry, so the analysis necessarily relies on a less complete picture of the entire population, since
labor force participants were more likely to report their industry. The effect on managerial status
is negative for females relative to males in both the construction and non-construction industries.
Sexual harassment laws hurt the promotion of women to management positions in construction and
non-construction industries to a similar degree since dividing by the overall inequality in manage-
ment status results in a similar negative impact in terms of percentage of overall inequality. This
finding is noteworthy for two reasons. First, this suggests that the estimated impacts of sexual
harassment law are not simply capturing a general time trend in female labor market outcomes.
Second, outsiders entering the labor force are probably not going to be managers in the first instance.
5.2 Insiders and Outsiders Thus far, we have shown positive effects of sexual harassment law
on female employment outcomes on average. We now turn to some evidence for the insider-outsider
theory of harassment and involuntary unemployment. If some women are insiders, then forbidding
sexual harassment should result in less ameliorative impacts for insider women. We do not have a
panel of individuals followed before and after legal changes, so in this analysis, we must make the
albeit rough approximation that labor force participants are insiders and non-participants outsiders.
Table VIII reports the estimated effects of sexual harassment law for labor force participants.
When the analysis is restricted to the labor force, we find that pro-plaintiff sexual harassment
decisions increased gender inequality by 0.16 hours worked last week, 0.004 in log real weekly
earnings, and 0.7 percentage points in the likelihood to be a manager. The bottom of the table
reports mean dependent variables for insider males and females that are similar to those found
in other studies of labor force participants (Blau and Kahn 2006). The joint F tests of statistical
significance are very large, 35, 58, and 30, respectively, for the lag interaction effects and 25, 13,
and 6 for the lag level effects. One of the lead coefficients is statistically significant for earnings in
Column 1.58
Next, we do some arithmetic to assess how much outsider females were gaining relative to insider
females, insider males, and outsider males.59 We want to attribute the effect of sexual harassment
law on female outsiders, female outsiders who enter the labor force, and insider females. We want to
do the same for male outsiders, male insiders who leave the labor force, and male insiders. (These
attributions account only for net flows. If there were significant inflows and outflows in the labor
58Given the number of F tests for lead coefficients, it may be expected that at least one would be statistically
significant.
59The mean dependent variables for insider males and females are similar to those found in other studies of labor
force participants (Blau and Kahn 2006).
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TABLE VIII
The Effect of Sexual Harassment Law on Insiders
Labor Force Partipants Reporting Non-Zero Wages
Earnings Hours Worked Management
(1) (2) (3)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.0256* 0.232 0.000853
Circuit Decisionst+1 (0.0101) (0.244) (0.00182)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.0208 -0.381 -0.00212
Circuit Decisionst+1 * Female (0.0135) (0.441) (0.00464)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.0257 0.0221 0.00545+
Circuit Decisionst (0.0206) (0.212) (0.00306)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.0243 -0.463 -0.0115*
Circuit Decisionst * Female (0.0283) (0.391) (0.00480)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.0299* -0.0781 0.00486*
Circuit Decisionst−1 (0.0118) (0.185) (0.00233)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.0343* -0.191 -0.00873*
Circuit Decisionst−1 * Female (0.0140) (0.257) (0.00403)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00465 -0.306 0.00240
Circuit Decisionst−2 (0.0138) (0.196) (0.00219)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.0126 0.485 -0.00326
Circuit Decisionst−2 * Female (0.0175) (0.419) (0.00568)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00226 0.343 -0.0000238
Circuit Decisionst−3 (0.0222) (0.245) (0.00283)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00444 -0.328 -0.00636
Circuit Decisionst−3 * Female (0.0184) (0.287) (0.00569)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00107 0.186 0.00276
Circuit Decisionst−4 (0.0169) (0.164) (0.00221)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.00688 -0.389* -0.00665*
Circuit Decisionst−4 * Female (0.00926) (0.177) (0.00285)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff 0.0150 0.370 0.00358+
Circuit Decisionst−5 (0.0291) (0.363) (0.00205)
Proportion Pro-Plaintiff -0.00821 -0.379 -0.00876**
Circuit Decisionst−5 * Female (0.0330) (0.486) (0.00260)
Controls Y Y Y
IV Y Y Y
Mean dependant variable - Male 6.298 42.90 0.144
Mean dependant variable - Female 5.854 36.04 0.120
Average interaction lag -0.004 -0.160 -0.007
Average level effect lag 0.008 0.103 0.003
Joint F of interaction lags 35.16 58.21 30.38
Joint F of interaction leads 2.38 0.75 0.21
Joint F of level effect lags 24.71 13.10 6.25
Joint F of level effect leads 6.47 0.90 0.22
N 2424997 2622664 2755279
R-sq 0.296 0.081 0.057
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. All regressions use MORG CPS and restrict to individuals between the
ages of 18 and 65. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Observations are clustered at the
Circuit level. All estimates are weighted using CPS survey weights. These regressions include individual controls
(age, race dummies, educational attainment dummies, and marital status dummy), Circuit fixed-effects, year
fixed-effects, a dummy for whether there were no cases in that Circuit-year. The regressions also include interactions
between the female indicator and the dummy for there being no cases, sexual harassment law, and the instruments
as well as the interactions of these variables with gender.
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force, insider women would be worse off and outsider women better off than our calculations indicate,
so our calculations may be viewed as a lower bound.)
Focusing on the average yearly lag effect over five years, Column 1 in Table VIII indicates that
insider men gained by 0.008 log real weekly earnings while insider women gained by 0.004 log
real weekly earnings. Column 6 in Table V indicates that insider and outsider men lost 0.086 log
real weekly earnings and insider and outsider women gained 0.027 log real weekly earnings. If we
approximate the 65% of women with part- or full-time employment to be insiders and similarly for
81% of men, then accounting for net movements into and out of labor force participation (Table V
Column 2) yields the following summary for the effects for females and males:
(0.35− 0.003) ∗ 0 + (0.003) ∗ 5.9 + (0.65) ∗ 0.004 = 0.020, which is near 0.027;
(0.19) ∗ 0 + (0.013) ∗ −6.3 + (0.81− 0.013) ∗ 0.008 = −0.075, which is near -0.086;
To explain the first equation, female outsiders who remained outsiders constitute nearly 35%,
female outsiders who enter the labor force constitute 0.3%, and insider females are 65%. Male
outsiders constitute 19%, insider males who became outsiders constitute 1.3% and the remaining
insiders constitute nearly 80%. The numbers 0.004 and 0.008 come from Table VIII Column 1. The
numbers 5.9 and 6.3 are the group-mean dependent variables in Table VIII. The numbers +0.3%
and -1.3% come from Table V Column 2.
In sum, forbidding sexual harassment caused wages of all labor force participants to increase,
and a portion of insider males to exit in response to, or because of, the entrance of outsider females.
The resulting gains for females were tilted towards outsider females who gained six times more
than insider females; outsider females also gained three times more than remaining insider males.
Another indication of the increase in productivity, particularly for females, is that while insider
females gained 0.004 log real weekly earnings, they lost in hours worked (a decline of 0.06 hours per
week) and also in managerial status (0.4 percentage point decline in likelihood to be a manager).
Taken together, these results suggest that forbidding sexual harassment in large part encouraged
the entry of outsider women, who then obtained part- or full-time employment and received wages,
and increased the productivity of women in the labor force.60 Previously insider men lost the most
in terms of employment status. We only analyze labor market outcomes, however, and are not doing
a welfare calculation along all margins.
60Outsider women asked for and received higher wages.
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6 Additional Remarks
Our empirical strategy uses the number of extreme judges assigned to sexual harassment cases
to approximate a true experiment. This requires that Circuit judges be randomly assigned. At the
Circuit-year level, the number of extreme judges per seat needs to be as good as randomly assigned,
conditional on having a case. We report three assessments of this assumption.
6.1 Interviews with government officials First, we surveyed a number of courts of appeal
and evaluated measures taken by them to ensure that the assignment of judges to panels is random.
In one court, two to three weeks before the oral argument, a computer program is used to randomly
assign available judges, including any visiting judges, to panels that will hear cases. The program
used is an in-house creation. There is a mechanism in the program that ensures the same judges are
not sitting together on panels. This is also checked manually, although the clerk could not remember
ever having manually to change judicial assignments for this reason. There is no specialization
among judges; the cases are “all over the map” in regard to subject matter. Senior judges tell the
clerk how often they are willing to sit and hear cases, and they are added to the program for
randomized assignment in accordance with their schedules. There is an administrative office that
sets the baseline number of cases senior judges must hear per term.
In another court, random assignment of panels occurs before the random assignment of cases.
Panels of judges are organized to hear cases on a yearly basis, randomly assigned together by
computer program and given dates for hearings. There are “holes” left in some of the panels by
the program, and visiting judges are plugged into those spots by the chief judge. This program
also ensures that the same judges are not seated together repeatedly. Thus, the judges know at the
beginning of the year which days they will be hearing cases and the compositions of the panels on
which they will sit.
Once all the briefing is completed, a case is put into a pool of cases “ready to calendar.” If a
panel of judges has previously looked at a case, it will be sent back to them (for example, if it
was remanded to resolve one issue). Otherwise, a different program randomly assigns cases to these
pre-established panels and dates. About eight weeks before the scheduled argument, a preliminary
calendar is sent out and the judges review it for recusal. If a judge must recuse himself, the case is
taken off the calendar and placed back in the pool for reassignment. Senior judges decide how many
days and which months they will work, and this information is entered into the program for random
assignment. Before the advent of computer programs, one judge did all of the panel assignments
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by hand, and the clerks randomly assigned the cases by hand. For more information about random
assignment of cases at the Circuit level, see Brown Jr. and Lee (2000).61
Other variations from random assignment include: en banc cases that are heard by the entire
pool of judges (or a significant fraction in Circuit 9). We do not use these cases, which are also
relatively infrequent. Judges can also take sick leave or go on vacation, but this is determined far
in advance. Not accounting for vacation, sick leave, senior status, en banc, remand, and recusal can
lead to the inference that judges are not randomly assigned. Our identification strategy assumes
that these kinds of deviations from random assignment are ignorable. Even a gold-standard random
process — the roll of a die — has a deterministic element. If known with precision, the force and
torque applied to the die, the subtle air currents, the hardness of the surface, etc., might allow us (or
a physicist) to determine with certainty the outcome of these “random” rolls. Despite this obvious
non-randomness, we would still have faith in the outcome of a trial with treatment assignments
based on die rolls because we are certain that the factors affecting the assignment have no impact
on the outcome of interest and hence are ignorable.
6.2 Orthogonality with pre-trial characteristics As a second randomization assessment,
we use data from Boyd et al. (2010), which codes some case characteristics for a subset of 415
gender discrimination cases in the Chicago Judges Projects data (Sunstein et al. 2006). We regress
case characteristics on male Democratic (female Republican) judges per seat and find that most
characteristics are not correlated with the judicial panel composition. Table IX shows that of 19 case
characteristics, one is correlated with male Democrats per seat and one is correlated with female
Republicans per seat. Both correlations are statistically significant at the 10% level. Given the
number of tests, it may be expected that 10% would be statistically significant at the 10% level. For
the 79 cases that we coded from 1982 to 1995, we also noted whether the plaintiff was the victim
of sexual harassment and which party appealed. The last two rows of Table IX show that these
case characteristics are also uncorrelated with judicial panel composition. Judicial characteristics
do appear orthogonal to case characteristics as determined before the assignment of Circuit judges.
6.3 Omnibus Test for Circuit Courts: Random Strings In our third randomization assess-
ment, we examine deviations from random assignment by seeing whether the sequence of proportions
of judges is similar to a random process. Figures 3A and 3B suggest visually that panel composition
is not serially correlated. We formally investigate this by:
61See also, http://law.du.edu/images/uploads/neutral-assignment/Neutral_assignment_links.pdf.
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TABLE IX
Randomization Check: Orthogonality with Case Characteristics as Determined by Lower Court
Male Democrats per seat Female Republicans per seat
Case Characteristics as Determined by Lower Court (1) (2)
Direction of Lower Court Decision 0.0115 -0.171
(0.0856) (0.187)
P claims employer acted in retaliation -0.102 0.184
(0.0936) (0.205)
All plaintiffs are female 0.0126 -0.0920
(0.0747) (0.164)
Title IX claim 0.0415 -0.0558
(0.0252) (0.0553)
Section 1983 claim 0.0533 -0.0474
(0.0500) (0.110)
Constructive discharge from employment 0.00764 0.0726
(0.0559) (0.122)
Procedural issues dominate 0.0167 0.163
(0.0586) (0.128)
P suing under state law 0.0677 -0.283
(0.0830) (0.181)
P claims illegally denied promotion -0.0591 -0.0465
(0.0755) (0.165)
P claims illegally not being hired -0.0909+ 0.105
(0.0529) (0.116)
P claims illegally fired 0.0460 -0.159
(0.0961) (0.210)
P claims unequal pay -0.0235 -0.0868
(0.0675) (0.148)
P sued under 14th Amendment 0.0606 -0.167+
(0.0429) (0.0938)
P sued under 1st Amendment 0.0574 -0.0503
(0.0353) (0.0775)
Damages major point of contention 0.0765 0.166
(0.0669) (0.147)
Contains Section 1981 claim 0.0295 -0.0818
(0.0585) (0.128)
Contains age discrimination claim 0.0368 -0.241
(0.0695) (0.152)
Contains pregnancy discrimination claim 0.0232 0.0911
(0.0484) (0.106)
Contains emotional distress claim -0.0781 0.0432
(0.0530) (0.116)
P not victim of harassment -0.0312 -0.338
(0.131) (0.340)
P is appellant -0.109 -0.349
(0.208) (0.541)
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each
coefficient represents a separate regression of a distinct case characteristic on male Democrats (female Republicans)
per seat. “P” refers to plaintiff.
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1. Propose a statistic that can be computed from the sequence of numbers of female Republicans
(male Democrats) per seat within a Circuit.
2. Compute the statistic for the actual sequence, s∗.
3. Compute the statistic for each of 1,000 bootstrap samples from the actual sequence, i.e., s1,
s2, s3 . . .sn. Since there were changes in the expected number of female Republicans (male
Democrats) per seat over time, we treat our bootstrap samples as a vector of realized random
variables, with the probability based on the expectation during the Circuit-year.
4. Compute the empirical p-value, pi by determining where s∗ fits into s1, s2, s3 . . .sn.
5. Repeat steps 1-4 and calculate pi for each unit.
We use the following statistics:
Autocorrelation: We see if the value in the jth case depends on the outcome in the j-1thcase. This
statistic can detect whether judicial assignments are “clustered,” meaning a higher than expected
number of back-to-back seat assignments to a particular type of judge. This test tells us whether
certain judges sought out sexual harassment cases, perhaps in sequence.
Mean-Reversion: We test whether there is any form of mean reversion in the sequence, meaning
that the assignment in the nth case is correlated with the assignment in previous n−1 cases. This test
tells us whether judges or their assignors were attempting to equilibrate their presence, considering
whether a judge was “due” for a sexual harassment case.
Longest-Run: We test whether there are abnormally long “runs” of certain types of judges
per seat. This test tells us whether certain Circuits may have assigned certain judges with sexual
harassment cases during certain time periods, for example, to achieve specialization.
Number of Runs: Instead of simulating 1000 random strings, we compute the exact statistic
for number of runs. This test captures violations of randomization at the case level rather than
Circuit-year. In power calculations, this test has less Type II error compared to the other tests.62
With a truly random process, the collection of all unit p-values should be uniformly distributed.
(Imagine that you generate summary statistics for 1000 random strings. The 1001th random string
should have a summary statistic that is equally likely to be anywhere from 1 to 1000.) A visual
examination suggests that the empirical distributions for our p-values approach the CDF of a
uniform distribution (Figure 4), which we formally test using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic
from an empirical null (Table X). Our p-values are uniformly distributed for all six tests except
62These random strings tests also have lower Type II error compared to regression.
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TABLE X
Randomization Check: P-values
Female Republican Male Democrat
Auto-correlation 0.34* 0.24
Mean Reversion 0.32 0.16
Longest Run 0.22 0.23
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
Values of Dn for Various P
n = 9 n = 12
Prob(sqr(n)*Dn<b) b/sqr(n) Prob(sqr(n)*Dn<b) b/sqr(n)
0.01 0 0.01 0.009
0.05 0.0373 0.05 0.0345
0.1 0.0619 0.1 0.0553
0.25 0.1091 0.25 0.09
0.5 0.1804 0.5 0.1574
0.75 0.2608 0.75 0.2275
0.9 0.3392 0.9 0.2958
0.95 0.3874 0.95 0.3381
0.99 0.4795 0.99 0.4288
autocorrelation for female Democrats, which is largely due to Circuit 6. In our robustness checks,
we drop one Circuit at a time.
We also checked one or two years before the true instrument, that judicial decision-making is not
correlated with future judicial assignment.
6.4 Randomization for District Judges District Courts assign one judge to a case randomly
or rotationally (Taha 2009; Bird 1975).63 For example, one District told us that random assignment
occurs within 24 hours of a case filing, which is handled in the order of its arrival. Waldfogel
(1995) reports that one District Court uses three separate randomization wheels and each wheel
63Cases being returned on remand from the Circuit court are not randomly assigned. We do not use remanded
cases in our dataset.
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corresponds to the anticipated case length.64 Related65 cases, if filed within a few weeks, may be
consolidated.66 Consolidation only occurs for relatively high-frequency case types, which does not
include free speech jurisprudence. For the handful of District cases that do overlap such that they
are consolidated, we assume the decisions about case relatedness occur in a manner exogenous to
judge assignment.
District Courts judges are revealed much earlier than Circuit Court judges. Ideally, we would
use docket filings in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts pertaining to free speech cases,
but judges are omitted for most cases prior to 2000, so we must use published District opinions to
construct our District IV. We buttress the assumption that settlement, publication, and strategic
use of keywords or citations are exogenous: 1) in District Courts, judges are much more constrained
and ideology has been found to play hardly any role. Judicial ideology does not predict settlement
rates (Ashenfelter et al. 1995; Nielsen et al. 2010), settlement fees (Fitzpatrick 2010), publication
choice (Taha 2004), or decisions in published or unpublished cases (Keele et al. 2009);67 2) we
64The ideal construction of w˜ct takes a weighted sum across wheels of deviation from expectations, E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
)
,
separately for senior and non-senior judges. Senior judges can elect not to be assigned to certain wheels. Another
District Court uses, instead of wheels, thirteen computer generated decks of cards–one deck for each case category
and an identical number of cards (two or five) for each active judge (http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/cmecf/Order-
for-Assignment-of-Cases.pdf). The decks refill when the majority of the deck has been exhausted. Senior judges can
request to be assigned to certain decks. Even within a deck, senior judges can ex ante request a “bye” for specialized
case types. Within each District Court are several courthouses (also referred to as Divisions). The appropriate Division
is determined by where the parties are located and where the cause of action arose. Some Divisions get their own
deck of cards. Taha (2009) reports that in 29 Districts, a case may be assigned to any judge in that District, while in
the others, the cases are assigned to a geographic Division within the District and randomly assigned to one of the
judges in that Division.
However, since E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
)
is uncomputable for senior judges since we would need to know the senior “byes” in
every District courthouse, we drop senior District judges for calculating w˜ct; we also drop visiting (judges routinely
visit other courts to assist with caseload) and magistrate judges (they assist District Court judges but do not have
life tenure and we do not have their biographical data) for similar reasons, collectively resulting in less than 10%
sample loss. Non-ideological cases are referred to magistrate judges (Nash 2015), so omitting them will not matter.
Identification is unaffected by dropping judges even if they are in the same wheel. Some courts spin separate random
wheels for District judges and for magistrate judges. In some Districts, parties can decline assignment to a magistrate
judge within a certain time period and request another random draw. This will not affect identification because it
happens before the random assignment that we use. In some Districts, when the federal government is a litigant on
the case, the U.S. attorney can pick the wheel.
In sum, conditional on case type, there is random assignment at the court or courthouse level, and we must only
calculate the yearly expected composition of judges in District courthouses, E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
)
, and we drop judges whose
E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
)
is unknowable.
65Related means that one decision will substantially resolve all cases.
66Waldfogel (1995) reports that plaintiffs can argue the case is related to another pending case and, if the judge
agrees, the cases will be consolidated. A clerk reported 8% of filed cases were accepted as related in 1991 in SDNY. In
another District Court, if a clerk identifies and two judges agree that a new civil case is related to another open civil
case, they will be consolidated in the interests of justice or judicial economy. The clerk brings the possible connection
to the attention of the judge of the new case, who then confers with the judge of the earlier case to determine whether
they are in fact related cases.
67This is consistent with the District judge identity only affecting outcomes through the presence of an appeal but
not through the District Court decision, but this is not necessary for the empirical analysis.
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examine these issues directly:68 we test whether District Court judicial biographical characteristics
in filed cases jointly predict publication.69 We are able to conduct this test because we link PACER
filing data, which has judge identity, to AOC data, which has information on publication.70 We
assume that remaining deviations from random assignment, like vacation days, are ignorable.
7 Alternative Theories
In this section, we consider several alternative theories to explain our findings.
Tax on Hiring Men: An alternative view of sexual harassment law is simply that it is a tax on
the hiring of men, who are potential harassers.71 A less sympathetic view is that sexual harassment
law mandates a transfer from females to males. However, if sexual harassment law was essentially a
tax on the hiring of men, we should have observed insider male outcomes to fall relative to insider
female outcomes, but they did not.
Machismo: The insider-outsider theory suggests intentional harassment, but the productivity of
females could have been lower simply due to their unfamiliarity with the machismo culture prevalent
before females were hired in substantial numbers. However, if this were the case, wages should not
be related to the elimination of machismo, but we find that both male and female insider wages
increased.
Compensating Differentials: Compensating differentials do not appear sufficient to explain
the findings. If insider women were compensated for having to face sexual harassment, their wages
would decline with as sexual harassment law developed; instead, their wages increased. Moreover, a
pure compensating differentials story would not explain why outsider women joined the work force.
Wages inside the labor force would have adjusted downwards for the decrease in sexual harassment
and outsider women on the margin would have been indifferent to entry.
Change in the Composition of the Female Labor Force: Perhaps in the absence of sexual
harassment law, firms chose to hire less productive women and after forbidding sexual harassment,
firms hired more productive women. However, this does not easily explain the exit of insider males
nor why insider male wages increased more than the wages of insider women.
68The random strings test is ineffective because some Districts use rotational assignment or random drawing of
judges from card decks without replacement.
69We use LASSO to select biographical characteristics and no characteristic was chosen.
70We obtained all freely available PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) data on District cases from
32 districts for 1980 to 2008 for a total of 359,595 non-duplicated cases. This data contains the name of the District
where the case was filed, the filing and termination date (missing for 10% of cases), the assigned docket number,
and the name of the District or magistrate judge presiding on the case. We merge the names of the judges into the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOC) database.
71The vast majority of sexual harassment cases were filed by women regarding sexual harassment by men.
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Mandated Benefit: While the mandated benefits view is not an alternative theory for the re-
sults, explaining why maternity mandates and the ADA had different effects from sexual harassment
law is worth mentioning. First, unlike maternity mandates, sexual harassment directly improves the
productivity of women by making a better work environment. Second, unlike ADA, it is far more
difficult to determine precisely which women are likely to impose the costs of sexual harassment
on a firm. Disabilities are often visible to employers and, therefore, the unfunded mandate of ac-
commodations may have led to calculated decisions to not hire particular disabled workers whereas
employers could not as easily make the same calculated decisions vis-a-vis women. Third, unlike the
cost of complying with the ADA or the federal requirement of providing maternity mandates, the
cost of compliance with sexual harassment law could be reduced by not hiring either the group being
harassed or the group doing the harassing. Men were hired less as well as women hired more, unlike
what happened with ADA. Fourth, the costs of sexual harassment law are quite high, although
exact figures for all the direct and indirect costs are difficult to obtain. Some labor lawyers observe
that the ADA further required large fixed costs upfront in physical infrastructure, whereas the fear
of a Title VII suit is always looming.
8 Conclusion
Making the workplace friendlier to women has been one of the most dramatic labor market
changes in the past half-century, yet, the consequences of forbidding sexual harassment on female
labor force outcomes remain unknown. The fact that female labor market outcomes improve more
than insider male labor market outcomes decline is consistent with the idea that there was some
degree of rent capture by insiders and suggests that firms were not profit-maximizing and forbidding
harassment on their own in the absence of sexual harassment law. It is also consistent with the
persistence of beliefs that women should play only certain roles, or should know their “place”, and
that this persistence accounts for a substantial portion of inequality.
Interpreting anti-discrimination law to forbid sexual harassment has been a key contribution of
academic scholarship in employment law. Unlike other employment laws, sexual harassment law
is generally considered "good" social policy and has not come under fire for its potential negative
consequences in the way that other employment protections, such as ADA and maternity mandates,
have. Yet, economic theory, at first glance, suggests that the potential effects of forbidding sexual
harassment may be similar to those of other employment mandates. It may exacerbate gender
inequality overall because it could be viewed as a tax on the hiring of women. We identify the
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impact of court-made sexual harassment precedent on gender inequality by using the fact that
federal judges are randomly assigned to Circuit cases along with the fact that gender and party
of appointment of judges affect sexual harassment decisions. We find that sexual harassment law
does not appear to exacerbate gender inequality. Pro-plaintiff precedent increases female wages and
employment relative to that of men. However, when restricted to people previously in the work force,
sexual harassment law has less ameliorative effects for females. These findings are more consistent
with an insider-outsider theory of involuntary unemployment–where insiders harass outsiders in
order to capture economic rents and forbidding harassment increases entry of outsiders, raising
their employment and then wages–than with compensating wage differentials or mandated benefits
models of sexual harassment.
Methodologically, the empirical framework developed here provides causal estimates of court
precedent holding all else equal including unobserved factors. It overcomes the basic issues of omitted
variables and reverse causality. Furthermore, it has the advantages that the exclusion restriction
is likely to hold, the LATE interpretation of the IV estimates are policy relevant, the general
equilibrium effects are those which we would want to include, and the impulse response function
is well-identified. We hope it proves fruitful for policy-makers and judges interested in assessing
the impact of court-made law as well as for scholars and theorists interested in evaluating theories
of behavioral responses to the law, exploring heterogeneity in terms of early or late decisions, or
exploiting variation in the sequence of decisions.
52
References
Abramowicz, Michael, Ian Ayres, and Yair Listokin, 2011, Randomizing Law, University of Pennsylvania Law Review
159, 929–1005.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Joshua D. Angrist, 2001, Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, The Journal of Political Economy 109, 915–957.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Guido W. Imbens, 1995, Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Average Causal Effects in
Models with Variable Treatment Intensity, Journal of the American Statistical Association 90, 431–442.
Araiza, Alberto G., Daniel L. Chen, and Susan Yeh, 2014, Does Appellate Precedent Matter? Stock Price Responses
to Appellate Court Decisions on FCC Actions, in Yun chien Chang, ed., Empirical Legal Analysis: Assessing the
Performance of Legal Institutions, volume 19 of Economics of Legal Relationships (Routledge).
Ashenfelter, Orley, Theodore Eisenberg, and Stewart J. Schwab, 1995, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, Journal of Legal Studies 24, 257–281.
Asmussen, Nicole, 2011, Female and Minority Judicial Nominees: President’s Delight and Senators’ Dismay?, Leg-
islative Studies Quarterly 36, 591–619.
Autor, David H., John J. Donohue, and Stewart J. Schwab, 2006, The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws, The Review
of Economics and Statistics 88, 211–231.
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney, 2005, Rising Wage Inequality: The Role of Composition
and Prices, NBER Working Papers 11628, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Badawi, Adam B., and Daniel L. Chen, 2014, The Shareholder Wealth Effects of Delaware Litigation, Working paper,
ETH Zurich, Mimeo.
Baliga, Sandeep, Eran Hanany, and Peter Klibanoff, 2013, Polarization and ambiguity, The American Economic
Review 103, 3071–3083.
Banerjee, Abhijit, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Daniel Keniston, and Nina Singh, 2012, Can Insti-
tutions be Reformed from Within? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment with the Rajasthan Police, NBER
Working Papers 17912, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Barondes, Royce De Rohan, 2010, Federal District Judge Gender and Reversals, in 5th Annual Conference on Em-
pirical Legal Studies Paper , Working Paper.
Barrios, Thomas, Rebecca Diamond, Guido W. Imbens, and Michal Kolesár, 2012, Clustering, Spatial Correlations
and Randomization Inference, Journal of the American Statistical Association 107, 578–591.
Barry, Nora, Laura Buchanan, Evelina Bakhturina, and Daniel L. Chen, 2016, Events Unrelated to Crime Predict
Criminal Sentence Length, Technical report.
Basu, Kaushik, 2003, The Economics and Law of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 17, 141–157.
Becker, Gary S., 1968, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal of Political Economy 76, 169–217.
Belloni, Alex, Daniel L. Chen, Victor Chernozhukov, and Chris Hansen, 2012, Sparse Models and Methods for Optimal
Instruments with an Application to Eminent Domain, Econometrica 80, 2369–2429.
Berdejó, Carlos, and Daniel L. Chen, 2014, Priming Ideology? Electoral Cycles without Electoral Incentives among
U.S. Judges, Working paper, ETH Zurich.
Bertrand, Marianne, and Esther Duflo, 2016, Field Experiments on Discrimination, Technical report, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004, How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-
Differences Estimates?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 249–275.
Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, The American Economic Review 94, 991–1013.
Bird, Susan Willett, 1975, The Assignment of Cases to Federal District Court Judges, Stanford Law Review 27,
475–487.
Black, Sandra E., and Philip E. Strahan, 2001, The Division of Spoils: Rent-Sharing and Discrimination in a Regulated
Industry, The American Economic Review 91, 814–831.
Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn, 2006, The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing Convergence,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 60, 45–66.
Boyd, Christina, Lee Epstein, and Andrew D. Martin, 2010, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging,
American Journal of Political Science 54, 389–411.
Breyer, Stephen, 2006, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (Vintage Books).
Brown Jr., Robert J., and Allison Herren Lee, 2000, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, Texas
Law Review 78, 1037–1116.
Card, David E., and John Enrico DiNardo, 2002, Technology and U.S. Wage Enequality: A Brief Look, Economic
Review 87, 45–62.
Charles, Kerwin K., Jonathan Guryan, and Jessica Pan, 2010, Sexism and Women’s Labor Market Outcomes, Working
paper, University of Chicago.
Charles, Kerwin Kofi, and Jonathan Guryan, 2008, Prejudice and Wages: An Empirical Assessment of Becker’s The
Economics of Discrimination, The Journal of Political Economy 116, 773–809.
Chay, Kenneth Y., 1998, The Impact of Federal Civil Rights Policy on Black Economic Progress: Evidence from the
53
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 51, 608–632.
Chen, Daniel, Yosh Halberstam, and Alan Yu, 2016a, Covering: Mutable Characteristics and Perceptions of (Mascu-
line) Voice in the U.S. Supreme Court, Technical report, Department of Economics-Toulouse School of Economics.
Chen, Daniel, Yosh Halberstam, and Alan Yu, 2016b, Covering: Mutable Characteristics and Perceptions of (Mascu-
line) Voice in the U.S. Supreme Court, Technical report, Department of Economics-Toulouse School of Economics.
Chen, Daniel L., 2004, Gender Violence and the Price of Virginity: Theory and Evidence of Incomplete Marriage
Contracts, Working paper, University of Chicago, Mimeo.
Chen, Daniel L., 2006, Islamic Resurgence and Social Violence During the Indonesian Financial Crisis, in Mark
Gradstein, and Kai A. Konrad, eds., Institutions and Norms in Economic Development , chapter 8, 179–199 (MIT
Press).
Chen, Daniel L., 2010, Club Goods and Group Identity: Evidence from Islamic Resurgence during the Indonesian
Financial Crisis, The Journal of Political Economy 118, 300–354.
Chen, Daniel L., 2013, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty? Evidence from British Commutations During
World War I, Working paper, ETH Zurich.
Chen, Daniel L., 2015, Can Markets Stimulate Rights? On the Alienability of Legal Claims, RAND Journal of
Economics 46, 23–65.
Chen, Daniel L., 2016, Priming Ideology: Why Presidential Elections Affect U.S. Courts of Appeals Judges, Technical
report.
Chen, Daniel L., Xing Cui, Lanyu Shang, and Jing Zhang, 2016c, What Matters: Agreement Between U.S. Courts of
Appeals Judges, Technical report.
Chen, Daniel L., Matt Dunn, Rafael Garcia Cano Da Costa, Ben Jakubowki, and Levent Sagun, 2016d, Early
Predictability of Asylum Court Decisions, Technical report.
Chen, Daniel L., and Jess Eagel, 2016, Can Machine Learning Help Predict the Outcome of Asylum Adjudications?,
Technical report.
Chen, Daniel L., Jens Frankenreiter, and Susan Yeh, 2014a, Measuring the Effects of Legal Precedent in U.S. Federal
Courts, Working paper, ETH Zurich.
Chen, Daniel L., Kristen Kwan, Maria Maass, , and Luisa Ortiz, 2016e, Law and Norms: Using Machine Learning to
Predict Attitudes Towards Women and Abortion, Technical report.
Chen, Daniel L., Vardges Levonyan, and Susan Yeh, 2014b, Do Policies Affect Preferences? Evidence from Random
Variation in Abortion Jurisprudence, Working paper, ETH Zurich.
Chen, Daniel L., and Jo Lind, 2007, Religion, Welfare Politics, and Church-State Separation, Journal of Ecumenical
Studies 42, 42–52.
Chen, Daniel L., and Jo Thori Lind, 2014, The Political Economy of Beliefs: Why Fiscal and Social Conservatives
and Liberals Come Hand-in-Hand, Working paper.
Chen, Daniel L., Tobias J. Moskowitz, and Kelly Shue, 2015, Decision-Making Under the Gambler’s Fallacy: Evidence
from Asylum Judges, Loan Officers, and Baseball Umpires, Working paper, ETH Zurich.
Chen, Daniel L., and James J. Prescott, 2016, Implicit Egoism in Sentencing Decisions: First Letter Name Effects
with Randomly Assigned Defendants .
Chen, Daniel L., and Martin Schonger, 2013, Social Preferences or Sacred Values? Theory and Evidence of Deonto-
logical Motivations, Working paper, ETH Zurich, Mimeo.
Chen, Daniel L., and Holger Spamann, 2014, This Morning’s Breakfast, Last Night’s Game: Detecting Extraneous
Factors in Judging, Working paper, ETH Zurich.
Chen, Daniel L., and Susan Yeh, 2013, Distinguishing Between Custom and Law: Empirical Examples of Endogeneity
in Property and First Amendment Precedents, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 21, 1081–1105.
Chen, Daniel L., and Susan Yeh, 2014a, Growth Under the Shadow of Expropriation? The Economic Impacts of
Eminent Domain, Working paper, ETH Zurich and George Mason University.
Chen, Daniel L., and Susan Yeh, 2014b, How Do Rights Revolutions Occur? Free Speech and the First Amendment,
Working paper, ETH Zurich.
Coles, Frances S., 1986, Forced to Quit: Sexual Harassment Complaints and Agency Response, Sex Roles 14, 81–95.
Dahl, Gordon B., Andreas Ravndal Kostøl, and Magne Mogstad, 2014, Family Welfare Cultures, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 129, 1711–1752.
Deaton, Angus, 2010, Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development, Journal of Economic Literature
48, 424–455.
Dixon, Rosalind, 2010, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial Appointment: A re-examination, Yale
Journal of Law and Feminism 21, 297–338.
Dobbin, Frank, and Erin L. Kelly, 2007, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of Legal Compliance in
Organizations1, American Journal of Sociology 112, 1203–1243.
Eberts, Randall W., and Joe A. Stone, 1985, Male-Female Differences in Promotions: EEO in Public Education, The
Journal of Human Resources 20, 504–521.
Edelman, Lauren B., 1992, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law,
American Journal of Sociology 97, 1531–1576.
Edelman, Lauren B., Christopher Uggen, and Howard S. Erlanger, 1999, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation:
54
Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, American Journal of Sociology 105, 406–54.
Eisenman, Russell, 1991, Gender and Racial Prejudice of Conservative College Women, Psychological Reports 68,
450–450.
Epstein, Richard A., 1995, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Harvard Uni-
versity Press).
Farhang, Sean, and Gregory Wawro, 2004, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Represen-
tation Under Panel Decision Making, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20, 299–330.
Fehr, Ernst, and Urs Fischbacher, 2002, Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on
Competition, Cooperation and Incentives, The Economic Journal 112, C1–C33.
Fitzpatrick, Brian T, 2010, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies 7, 811–846.
Franks, Mary Anne, 2011, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, Columbia Journal of Gender
and Law 20, 224–261.
Gennaioli, Nicola, and Andrei Shleifer, 2007, The Evolution of Common Law, The Journal of Political Economy 115,
43–68.
Goldman, Sheldon, 1999, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt Through Reagan (Yale Uni-
versity Press).
Gruber, Jonathan, 1994, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, The American Economic Review 84, 622–
641.
Haire, Susan B., Donald R. Songer, and Stefanie A. Lindquist, 2003, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal
Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, Law & Society Review 37, 143–168.
Hellerstein, Judith K., David Neumark, and Kenneth R. Troske, 2002, Market Forces and Sex Discrimination, The
Journal of Human Resources 37, 353–380.
Hersch, Joni, 2011, Compensating Differentials for Sexual Harassment, The American Economic Review Papers and
Proccedings 101, 630–634.
Hill, Catherine, and Holly Kearl, 2011, Crossing the Line: Sexual Harassment at School (American Association of
University Women).
Jolls, Christine, 2001, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, Harvard Law Review 115, 642–699.
Jordan, Samuel P., 2007, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement, and Adjudication, Brigham Young University Law
Review 2007, 55–107.
Juliano, Ann, and Stewart J. Schwab, 2000, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, Cornell Law Review 86, 548–592.
Katz, Daniel Martin, Michael James Bommarito, Tyler Soellinger, and James Ming Chen, 2015, Law on the Market?
Evaluating the Securities Market Impact of Supreme Court Decisions, SSRN (August 24, 2015) .
Keele, Denise M., Robert W. Malmsheimer, Donald W. Floyd, and Lianjun Zhang, 2009, An Analysis of Ideological
Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 6, 213–239.
Klarman, Michael, 2004, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality
(Oxford University Press, New York).
Kling, Jeffrey R., 2006, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings, The American Economic Review 96, 863–
876.
Lindbeck, Assar, and Dennis J. Snower, 1988, Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-
Outsider Approach, The American Economic Review 78, 167–188.
Lindbeck, Assar, and Dennis J. Snower, 2001, Insiders versus Outsiders, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 15,
165–188.
Maestas, Nicole, Kathleen J. Mullen, and Alexander Strand, 2013, Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage
Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt, American Economic Review 103,
1797–1829.
Merritt, Deborah Jones, and James J. Brudney, 2001, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United
States Courts of Appeals, Vanderbilt Law Review 54, 69–121.
Nash, Jonathan R., 2015, Examining Federal District Judges’ Referrals to Magistrate Judges, in 2015 Annual Meeting
of the International Society of New Institutional Economics (ISNIE), number 1-44.
Neal, Derek, 2004, The Measured Black - White Wage Gap among Women Is Too Small, Journal of Political Economy
112, S1–S28.
Neumark, David, 2016, Experimental Research on Labor Market Discrimination, Technical report, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Neumark, David, and Wendy A. Stock, 2006, The Labor Market Effects of Sex and Race Discrimination Laws,
Economic Inquiry 44, 385–419.
Newman, Meredith A., Robert A. Jackson, and Douglas D. Baker, 2003, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace,
Public Administration Review 63, 472–483.
Nielsen, Laiura B., Robert L. Nelson, and Ryon Lancaster, 2010, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?
Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
7, 175–201.
Olivetti, Claudia, and Barbara Petrongolo, 2008, Unequal Pay or Unequal Employment?: A Cross-Country Analysis
55
of Gender Gaps, Journal of Labor Economics 26, 621–654.
O’Neill, June, 2003, The Gender Gap in Wages, circa 2000, The American Economic Review 93, 309–314.
Peresie, Jennifer L., 2005, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate
Courts, The Yale Law Journal 114, 1759–1790.
Pierce, Chester, 1970, Offensive mechanisms, The black seventies 265–282.
Posner, Richard A., 1998, Against Constitutional Theory, New York University Law Review 73, 1–22.
Rowe, Mary, 1981, The minutiae of discrimination: The need for support, Outsiders on the inside: Women and
organizations 155–71.
Schultz, Vicki, 1990, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, Harvard Law Review 103, 1749–1843.
Schultz, Vicki, 1998, Reconceptualizing sexual harassment, The Yale Law Journal 107, 1683–1805.
Sen, Maya, 2015, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Appellate Review in U.S. Courts, Journal of Legal Studies 44,
(In Press).
Shoag, Daniel, 2011, The Impact of Government Spending Shocks: Evidence on the Multiplier from State Pension
Plan Returns, Working paper, Harvard University, Mimeo.
Steinbuch, Robert, 2009, An Empirical Analysis of Reversal Rates in the Eighth Circuit During 2008, Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review 43, 51–19.
Stock, James H., and Motohiro Yogo, 2005, Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression, in Donald W.K.
Andrews, and James H. Stock, eds., Identification and Inference for Economic Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas
Rothenberg , 80–108 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA).
Summers, Lawrence H., 1989, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, The American Economic Review 79,
177–183.
Summers, Lawrence H., 2005, Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science and Engineering Workforce,
in National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Diversifying the Science and Engineering Workforce.
Cambridge, MA. Retrieved March, volume 9.
Sunstein, Cass R., David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman, and Andres Sawicki, 2006, Are Judges Political?: An Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Brookings Institution Press).
Taha, Ahmed E., 2004, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, American Law and Economics
Review 6, 1–27.
Taha, Ahmed E., 2009, Judge Shopping: TestingWhether Judges’ Political Orientations Affect Case Filings, University
of Cincinnati Law Review 20, 101–135.
Waldfogel, Joel, 1995, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, The Journal
of Political Economy 103, 229–260.
56
Figure 1 
!
0"5"10
"
15
"
20
"
25
"
30
"
35
"
40
" 19
80
"
19
85
"
19
90
"
19
95
"
20
00
"
20
05
"
Fi
gu
re
"2
:"S
ex
ua
l"H
ar
as
sm
en
t"D
ec
isi
on
s,
"1
98
2>
20
02
" N
um
be
r"o
f"S
ex
ua
l"H
ar
as
sm
en
t"D
ec
isi
on
s"
N
um
be
r"o
f"P
ro
>P
la
in
Cff
"S
ex
ua
l"H
ar
as
sm
en
t"D
ec
isi
on
s"
N
um
be
r"o
f"P
ro
>D
ef
en
da
nt
"S
ex
ua
l"H
ar
as
sm
en
t"D
ec
isi
on
s"
Figure 3A 
 
 
Figure 3B 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 3
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 4
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 6
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 7
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 8
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 9
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 10
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 11
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 12
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 #
 o
f M
ale
 D
em
oc
ra
t A
pp
oin
te
es
 p
er
 s
ea
t
Ac
tu
al 
# 
of
 M
ale
 D
em
oc
ra
t A
pp
oin
te
es
 p
er
 s
ea
t
Year
Random Variation by Circuit -- Male Democrat
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 2
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 3
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 4
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 5
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 6
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 7
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 8
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 9
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 10
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 11
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Circuit 12
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 #
 o
f F
em
ale
 R
ep
ub
lic
an
 A
pp
oin
te
es
 p
er
 s
ea
t
Ac
tu
al 
# 
of
 F
em
ale
 R
ep
ub
lic
an
 A
pp
oin
te
es
 p
er
 s
ea
t
Year
Random Variation by Circuit -- Female Republican
Figure 4: Randomization Check 
 
 
P-Values of Male Democrat strings   P-Values of Female Republican strings 
 
 
Figure 5A: Pro-Plaintiff Sexual Harassment Decisions and Composition of Judicial Panel 
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Nonparametric local polynomial estimates are computed using an Epanechnikov kernel.  
The bandwidth is 0.14 for the male Democrat graph and 0.09 for the female Republican 
graph.  Shaded area indicates 90 percent confidence bands.  The residuals are calculated 
removing circuit and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Figure 1: Composition of District Panels, Absence of Appellate Panels, and 
Composition of Appellate Panels 
 
 
 
Nonparametric local polynomial estimates are computed using an Epanechnikov kernel.  
The bandwidth is 0.24 for the absence of appellate panels graph and 0.11 and 0.09 for the 
male Democrat and female Republican graph.  Shaded area indicates 90 percent 
confidence bands.  The residuals are calculated removing circuit and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix
A Major Doctrinal Developments in Sexual Harassment Law
1964 – Title VII – prohibits sex discrimination in employment.
1976 – Williams v. Saxbe – Court recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination when sexual
advances by male supervisor towards female employee, if proven, would be deemed an artificial barrier to employment
placed before one gender and not another.
1977 – Barnes v. Costle – U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District ruled that retaliation against a female
employee for rejecting sexual advances of her boss is a violation of Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination.
1980 – EEOC issues guidelines forbidding “sexual harassment” as a form of sex discrimination.
1985 – McKinney v. Dole - U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit ruled that physical violence, even if it is
not overtly sexual, can be sexual harassment if the unwelcome conduct is based on the victim’s gender.
1986 – Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson – The Supreme Court first recognized “sexual harassment” as
a violation of Title VII and established the standards for analyzing whether the conduct was welcome and levels of
employer liability.
1988 – Hall v. Gus Construction - U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth District finds that when male
construction workers “hazed” three female colleagues, even if the conduct was not specifically sexual in nature, was
gender based harassment.
1991 – Ellison v. Brady – Changed analysis of conduct from reasonable person to reasonable women test when
determining whether actionable sexual harassment occurred.
1991 – Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for jury trials and for increased damages in Title VII sexual harassment
suits.
1993 – Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc – plaintiff may bring sexual harassment claim without necessarily
showing psychological harm. In addition to Meritor, the factors when analyzing whether sexual harassment occurred
include: (i) Frequency of conduct; (ii) Severity; (iii) Whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating;
(iv) Or is a mere offensive utterance; (v) And whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with employees work
performance; (vi) No Single Factor is Required but Totality of the Circumstances Test.
1998 – Faragher v. City of Boca Raton - Supreme Court decision that establishes that an employer is subject
to vicarious liability for hostile environment created by a supervisor unless the employer can demonstrate that it
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior and that the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.
1998 – Burlington Industries, Inc v. Ellerth - Companion Supreme Court decision to Faragher that further
elaborates that the employer’s “Faragher” defense to vicarious liability is not available if the employee suffers a tangible
job consequence as result of supervisor’s actions.
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APPENDIX TABLE I
First Stage Relationship Between Absence of Circuit Cases and Judicial Composition of District
Court Cases, 1986-2002
Circuit-Year Level Outcome: Absence of Circuit Casest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black judges per District caset 0.470* 0.485** 0.419* 0.459**
(0.176) (0.138) (0.145) (0.144)
Black judges per District caset+1 -0.0492 -0.0248
(0.369) (0.357)
Black judges per District caset+2 -0.0192
(0.374)
Circuit-year controls N N N Fixed Effects
N 203 190 177 203
R-sq 0.019 0.020 0.014 0.372
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Observations
are clustered at the Circuit level. Fixed effects are dummy indicators for Circuit and for year.
B District IV
We report a first-stage correlation between the presence of a Circuit case and the proportion of District cases in
a Circuit that received a Black judge, with an F-statistic of 7. With the inclusion of Circuit and year fixed effects,
the point estimates are identical and the F-statistic goes up to 10 as can be seen from comparing Columns 1 and
4 in Appendix Table I. The average Circuit-year had 8% of District cases ruled by a Black judge, which decreased
the probability the Circuit-year had an appeal by 46% (Appendix Table I and Appendix Figure 1). Sen (2015) also
reports that ethnicity of the District judge, in particular, being Black, predicts differences in how their opinions are
treated.
Columns 2 and 3 of Appendix Table I show that the proportion of District cases heard by a Black judge is not
related to the presence of a Circuit case in the previous one or two years. The proportion of District cases in a Circuit
that received a Black judge is uncorrelated with the number of male Democrats (female Republicans) per seat in
Circuit cases as indicated in the second and third figures of Appendix Figure 1. For 1982-1985, most Circuits did not
have any District-level sexual harassment cases so when the District IV is employed, those years are dropped from
the sample. Since we may expect a lag between District and Circuit Court rulings, we also considered the relationship
between the presence of a Circuit case and the previous year’s assignment of District judges to sexual harassment
cases. Regardless of the source of variation, the two-stage least squares estimates are very similar, which is consistent
with the 2SLS results being unaffected by the inclusion of District instruments.
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